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General abstract
Individuals that interact socially regularly have to make decisions whether to help another
individual (provide some payoff benefit, possible at a personal payoff cost) or not. Here, a pair
of individuals is best off if both individuals help each other, but a single individual may gain a
relative payoff advantage by not helping (defecting) while the partner does choose to help, thus
creating a dilemma. Because social interactions are often repeated, individuals can condition the
actions they take on the actions taken by their partner in previous rounds of interaction. The
so-called partner control mechanisms positive reciprocity (where acts of helping are conditioned
on receiving help from the partner), punishment, and partner switching have all been shown to
stabilize cooperation in populations where the individuals engage in repeated pairwise interactions.
What remains unclear, however, is under which conditions each partner control mechanism will be
dominant in a population if the the partner control mechanisms coevolve.
Additionally, the expressed behaviour in repeated social interactions may depend on the state
of the environment in which the interactions take place. Social grooming in primates is likely to
depend on the food competition that the individuals experience. If food is clustered and monopo-
lizable, high ranked individuals may defend food sources, where low ranked individuals then need
to groom high ranked ones in order to be tolerated on the food source, resulting in grooming being
directed up the hierarchy. However, the conditions that cause grooming to be traded for grooming
or grooming to be traded for tolerance have yet to be quantified.
In this thesis, I developed several agent-based models in order to investigate both the coevolution
of various partner control mechanisms and the grooming patterns in primates.
In chapter one, I demonstrated that in a well-mixed population the likelihood of partner switch-
ing being the dominant partner control mechanism increases with increasing number of rounds of
interaction. Furthermore, if interactions are localized to small groups of unrelated individuals,
then punishment is more likely to be favoured by selection compared to the well-mixed case, while
the conditions where positive reciprocity is dominant are less clearly defined.
In chapter two, I investigated how limited migration of offspring, overlapping generations,
and complexity costs affect the competitiveness of each partner control mechanism. It is shown
that the relative competitiveness of partner switching is increased due to generational overlap,
while punishment is most strongly negatively affected by complexity costs. Additionally, while
the conditions where these partner control mechanisms are dominant in the population increases
if the population is kin structured, the conditions where unconditional helping is dominant over
conditional helping strategies are rather stringent.
In chapter three, I developed a reinforcement learning model that simulated grooming and
feeding interactions in primates. The model generated patterns of grooming reciprocity in the
absence of food competition, while grooming was found to be directed up the hierarchy if individuals
compete for food. It is shown that grooming up the hierarchy may not necessarily increase with
increasing food competition, and that an increase in aggressiveness causes grooming to become
more reciprocal.
In summary, helping behaviours occur in a diversity of repeated social interactions in natural
populations. By exploring a large range of conditions, the models developed in this thesis provide
insights regarding which partner control mechanism is likely to be dominant in a population. In
addition, the model from chapter three shows how grooming patterns may depend on a variety of
relevant parameters.
Keywords: social behaviour; repeated interactions; partner control mechanisms; simulation mod-
els; cooperation; helping
Re´sume´ ge´ne´ral
Les individus qui interagissent socialement doivent souvent de´cider entre aider leur prochain,
en leur procurant un be´ne´fice a un possible cout, ou pas. Tandis qu’une paire d’individus s’en
sort mieux si les deux s’entraident, un individu peut tirer un be´ne´fice relatif s’il se de´cide a` ne pas
aider tandis que l’autre l’aide. Cette situation cre´e un dilemme social. Parce que les interactions
sociales sont souvent re´pe´te´es, les individus peuvent conditionner leurs propres actions sur les
actions de leur partenaire lors d’interactions passe´es. Il existe trois me´canismes de controˆle de
partenaire qui stabilisent la coope´ration lors d’interactions re´pe´te´es entre paires d’individus: la
re´ciprocite´ positive (la de´cision d’aider est conditionne´e sur l’aide du partenaire lors de l’interaction
pre´ce´dente), la punition, et le changement de partenaire. Mais les conditions sous lesquelles un
me´canisme domine sur les autres lorsque les trois me´canismes coe´voluent dans une meˆme population
sont mal comprises.
Un autre point qu’il est important de conside´rer pour comprendre les interactions sociales est
que le comportement exprime´ peut aussi de´pendre sur l’environnement. Il est probable que le
toilettage social chez les primates, par exemple, de´pend de la compe´tition sur les ressources de
nourriture. Si la nourriture est concentre´e dans l’espace et facilement monopolise´e, les individus
en haut de la hie´rarchie sociale peuvent de´fendre ces ressources, auquel cas les individus en bas de
la hie´rarchie doivent les toiletter afin d’eˆtre tole´rer sur leur territoire et acce´der a` leur ressource.
Afin de comprendre ce comportement, il est ne´cessaire de comprendre les conditions sous lesquelles
le toilettage est e´change´ contre du toilettage, ou contre la tole´rance sur un territoire.
Dans cette the`se, je de´veloppe et utilise des mode`les agents base´s pour explorer la coe´volution
des me´canismes de controˆle de partenaire et l’e´volution de patrons de toilettage chez les primates.
Dans le premier chapitre, je de´montre que dans une population panmictique, plus les inter-
actions sont re´pe´te´es, plus il est probable que le changement de partenaire soit le me´canisme de
controˆle de partenaire dominant. Si les interactions sont restreintes au sein de petits groupes de
non-apparente´s, alors la punition est le me´canisme le plus probablement favorise´ par la se´lection.
Les conditions pour que la re´ciprocite´ positive soit dominante sont moins clairement de´finies.
Dans le deuxie`me chapitre, j’e´tudie comment la dispersion limite´e chez la proge´niture, le recou-
vrement de ge´ne´ration, et le cout de la complexite´ influencent la compe´titivite´ de chaque me´canisme
de controˆle. Il est de´montre´ que la compe´titivite´ du changement de partenaire est accrue par le
recouvrement de ge´ne´ration tandis que celle de la punition est tre`s diminue´e par le cout de com-
plexite´. De plus, alors que les conditions pour que ces me´canismes de controˆle de partenaire
soient dominants s’e´largissent avec la structure d’apparentement, les conditions pour que l’aide
inconditionnelle domine sur l’aide conditionnelle se restreignent.
Dans le troisie`me chapitre, je de´veloppe un model d’apprentissage par renforcement pour simuler
les interactions de toilettage et l’acce`s a la nourriture chez les primates. On observe des patrons
de toilettage re´ciproque lorsqu’il n’y pas de compe´tition pour les ressources, et des patrons de
toilettage dirige´ vers le haut de l’e´chelle hie´rarchique lorsque la compe´tition pour les ressources
augmente. Il est montre´ que l’effort dans le toilettage n’augmente pas force´ment avec la compe´tition
pour les ressources, et qu’une augmentation d’agressivite´ ame`ne le toilettage a` eˆtre plus re´ciproque.
En bref, les comportements sociaux d’entraide dans les milieux naturels sont observe´s dans
une multitude d’interactions sociales re´pe´te´es. En explorant une gamme varie´e de conditions, les
mode`les de´veloppe´s dans cette the`se permettent de mieux comprendre quels me´canismes de controˆle
de partenaire sont favorise´s par la se´lection naturelle. De plus, le mode`le du troisie`me chapitre
montre que les patrons de toilettage de´pendent de plusieurs parame`tres naturels importants.
Mots cle´s: comportement social; interactions re´pe´te´es; me´canismes de controˆle de partenaire;
mode`les de simulation; coope´ration; aider
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General introduction
Organisms (of whatever species) frequently engage in social interactions (Dugatkin, 1997; Sachs
et al., 2004). There are countless examples where the expressed behaviours of an organism affect
the fitness of those in its spatial neighbourhood. These behaviours vary from bacteria releasing
siderophores (molecules to absorb iron) that other bacteria can profit from (Griffin et al., 2004), to
plants providing nectar to various insect species (Kearns et al., 1998), to fish aggregating in large
schools (Castro et al., 2002), to cooperative breeding in birds and mammals (Arnold and Owens,
1998; Jennions, 1994). Regularly, the interacting individuals have to make decisions whether to
help the other (providing some benefit), possible at a personal cost (i.e., an investment), or not to
help the other. Provided that the benefit of helping outweighs the cost, then a pair of individuals
would be best off by helping each other. However, one individual can gain a relative advantage
by not reciprocating the help it receives (defecting), a situation that is elegantly captured in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). Despite the
apparent dilemma, examples of cooperation (i.e., an interaction between individuals that benefits
all individuals involved) are widespread in nature. While the existence of helping behaviours
and cooperation has often been presented as a puzzle, a large number of solutions have been
suggested (Lehmann and Keller, 2006; West et al., 2007; Leimar and Hammerstein, 2010; Bshary
and Bronstein, 2011). A number of solutions comprise conditional decision making in repeated
interactions, and in this thesis I investigate various such solutions.
Hamilton showed that a social trait (such as the propensity to help) can evolve if the fitness cost
to the individual (c) is outweighed by the fitness benefit it confers to the recipient (b) multiplied
by the coefficient of relatedness (r), yielding Hamilton’s rule: rb − c > 0 (Hamilton, 1964a,b).
However, interactions between unrelated individuals (e.g., in mutualisms, Bronstein, 2001, 2009),
where r = 0, require alternative solutions, where the individuals thus has to gain a direct fitness
benefit. Here, the solution comes from the fact that many social interactions are repeated. For
example, an insect may visit the same plant more than once, and birds may raise several broods
together. Then, cooperation can be maintained in a population if the individuals involved use
social strategies that ensure that helpful individuals are benefited more through the interactions
than defecting ones (West et al., 2007; Bshary and Bronstein, 2011). Studies investigating the
optimal strategies in a variety of games are numerous (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Boyd
and Lorberbaum, 1987; Boyd and Richerson, 1988, 1992; Enquist and Leimar, 1993; Clutton-Brock
and Parker, 1995; Leimar, 1997b; Joyce et al., 2006; Izquierdo et al., 2010, 2014). However, due
to the rich diversity of repeated social interactions in nature, many open questions remain. For
example, while many studies characterize conditions where a specific helping strategy is favoured
by selection over defecting strategies, relatively few studies pit different helping strategies against
one another in order to find which type is likely to be selected under those conditions. Additionally,
once a strategy has evolved, the expressed behaviour may still largely depend on the environment
under which it is expressed. In order to fully understand the diversity of cooperation and helping
behaviours in nature, models that capture the essential aspects of the interactions are required.
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Evolution of social strategies
Evolution is the change in allele frequency over generations (Schoener, 2011). The alleles, in
concert with the environment, determine the phenotype of the individual (its body size, colour,
etc). Individuals that are better adapted to the current environment will leave more offspring than
others, and the heritable traits of those individuals will be represented more in the next generation.
As evolution shapes any trait, so too does it shape social strategies (i.e., the specification of the
actions an individual will take in social interactions, Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). Since the
actions an individual takes will influence its fitness, those individuals that take the “best” actions
will produce more offspring, who in turn behave similar to their parents.
Evolutionary game theory is the study of the evolution of strategies in a population of interacting
individuals (Maynard Smith, 1982; Hammerstein and Selten, 1994; Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998). It emerged from the field of game theory where the focus is on optimal strategic
behaviour between rational agents (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994; Myerson, 1997). If interactions
are repeated, then an individual can respond to the behaviour of another. In other words, the
actions an individual takes can be conditioned on the actions of others. If one just considers
helping and defecting behaviours, an infinite set of strategies can be hypothesized. Actions can
be taken probabilistically, conditional on the partner only, conditional on the outcome of previous
interactions (taking into account both the partner and oneself), and the memory to remember the
history of interactions can vary from absent to complete. In addition, other types of actions can
be included in the model (for example, stop the interaction with the current partner). There thus
exists a wide variety of potential social strategies. Understanding which ones are likely to evolve,
and how this depends on the conditions under which the individuals interact is a key topic in
evolutionary biology.
Partner control mechanisms
In repeated social interactions, an individual may have different options on how to respond to a
defector, where a conditional response that reduces the partner’s payoff relative to that of cooper-
ating with it is defined as a partner control mechanism. The individual can condition its decision
to help a partner based on whether the partner has helped the individual in previous interactions,
which is called positive reciprocity. The most well-known strategy using positive reciprocity is tit-
for-tat, which helps (cooperates in game theoretic terms) on the first interaction, while in following
interactions it copies the actions of the partner in the previous interaction. In competition with
a range of different strategies, tit-for-tat was found to do best on average (Axelrod and Hamil-
ton, 1981). Consequently, a number of studies then identified conditions under which tit-for-tat
and other positive reciprocal strategies could maintain cooperation in a population of interacting
individuals, and how this may depend on group size, partner quality, cognitive constraints, and
more (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Leimar, 1997a; Fishman et al., 2001; Sherratt and Roberts, 2001;
Andre´, 2014).
While in game theoretic models individuals are assumed to be stuck with one another, in
nature the interaction structure is more likely to represent a biological market where individuals
may choose their preferred interaction partner (Noe¨ and Hammerstein, 1994; Hammerstein and
Noe¨, 2016). A partner control mechanism that allows an individual to interact with a variety of
individuals is partner switching, where the individual can choose to stop the interaction with the
defector and search for a new partner. Although partner switching is not an active partner choice
mechanism, it still allows individuals to avoid prolonged interactions with specific individuals.
Here, factors such as the cost of switching, the number of interactions, and others may determine
whether a switching strategy evolves (Aktipis, 2004; Izquierdo et al., 2010, 2014; Enquist and
Leimar, 1993; Hamilton and Taborsky, 2005; Joyce et al., 2006).
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An individual may also respond to a defector by punishing it, i.e., pay a personal payoff cost
that reduces the payoff of the defector (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995). Punishing strategies
have been investigated widely in order to identify conditions where it may stabilize cooperation
in a population. Among the examined factors are the reputation of the individual for being a
punisher or not, the structure of the population, group size, the effect of retaliation, and more
(Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Boyd et al., 2003; Janssen and Bushman, 2008; Santos et al., 2011;
Shutters, 2011; Powers et al., 2012; Wolff, 2012).
Despite this wealth of models, there are relatively few that investigate when one type of response
will yield more payoff for an individual (and thus a higher fitness) compared to others. However,
in order to understand which conditions favour the evolution of which partner control mechanism,
models are needed where the coevolution of partner control mechanisms is investigated.
Ecological influence on behaviour
Additionally, one can study how the ecology influences the behaviour of an individual (Maher
and Lott, 2000). Substantial variation in behavioural patterns can be found between populations
of the same species (Dall et al., 2004). Although some of this variation is due to genetic effects
(Fuller, 1960), many species live in highly variable environments and constantly need to adjust
their behaviour to the current state of the environment. Here, one can think of an individual
that feeds in different patches. The energy intake can vary between patches, but will also decay
over time (as food depletes). In order to optimize intake, individuals have to use a learning rule
to determine the duration of time spend on a patch (McNamara and Houston, 1985). Also the
social environment can vary between populations or within populations over time (Borgeaud et al.,
2016). For an individual to navigate its actions when interacting repeatedly with both the social
and non-social environment it is thus likely to use learning rule to optimize its behaviour (Harley,
1981; Bo¨rgers and Sarin, 1997; Camerer and Hua Ho, 1999). Therefore, an interesting area of
research is to investigate how the state of the environment affects patterns of behaviour.
Primate grooming
The exchange of grooming in primates is an interesting example where the environment is likely to
influence the grooming patterns. Grooming is a helpful act where individuals groom each other in
order to remove ectoparasites and strengthen the social bond (Tanaka and Takefushi, 1993; Dunbar,
1991). Grooming is often found to be traded reciprocally (trading grooming for grooming), where
two individuals in a dyad groom each other equally much over longer periods of time (Rowell
et al., 1991; Barrett et al., 1999; Leinfelder et al., 2001; Pazol and Cords, 2005). Alternatively,
grooming is regularly found to be directed up the hierarchy, where high ranked individuals receive
more grooming than low ranked individuals (Seyfarth, 1980; Ventura et al., 2006; Wei et al., 2012;
Roubova´ et al., 2015). It is argued that this is the result of food competition (van Schaik, 1989;
Sterck et al., 1997; Kappeler and van Schaik, 2002). If food sources are clustered and monopolizable,
then high ranked individuals are expected to defend food sources and exclude lower ranked ones
from feeding there. In order to gain access to a food patch, a low ranked individual needs to groom
the high ranked one in order to be tolerated on the patch (Ventura et al., 2006; Carne et al., 2011;
Tiddi et al., 2011; Xia et al., 2012).
Although there is ample empirical evidence supporting both types of grooming (reciprocal
grooming and grooming up the hierarchy), the conditions where either is expected to occur are
based on verbal reasoning alone. Up until now, no quantitative model has shown that food com-
petition can result in grooming being traded for tolerance, and thus there are no predictions as to
how the intensity of food competition modulates the level of grooming up the hierarchy. Therefore,
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understanding how grooming patterns are affected by the ecology of the population is a key topic
in primatology (Seyfarth, 1980; Schino, 2001).
Main question
In this work I study repeated social interactions using two different approaches. First, I study the
coevolution of various conditional strategies. The question I address is: “Under which conditions
will positive reciprocity, partner switching, or punishment be dominant in a population if these
partner control mechanisms coevolve?”. These three mechanisms comprise the main type of re-
sponses to stabilize cooperation in a two player game, and thus understanding the conditions where
each is relatively favoured over the alternative ones is of critical importance. The second question
is specifically addressed to primates: “What are the conditions that cause grooming to be directed
up the hierarchy?”. Grooming can be traded reciprocally (for grooming) or for rank-related bene-
fits (e.g., tolerance on food patches). It is argued that food competition favours the latter type of
trading, but no model has demonstrated this effect until now, and thus no quantitative predictions
regarding how food competition modulates the grooming up the hierarchy exist.
Approach
The technique I use to study these questions is agent-based modelling. Agent-based modelling
is a relatively recent scientific method, which has increased greatly in popularity in recent years
(Niazi and Hussain, 2011). An agent-based model consists of a set of interacting agents (often
individuals), where the agents make decisions (take actions) according to a specified set of rules,
where the rules of interaction (e.g., model parameters that determine payoff) are specified by the
experimenter (Bonabeau, 2002; Bankes, 2002; An et al., 2009). In this thesis I develop two types
of agent-based models: an evolutionary one and a learning one. In the evolutionary model, agents
collect payoff through their interaction with one another, where agents that accumulate most payoff
generate most new agents (offspring) in a following time step (generation). As such, agents with
the best decision rules (strategies) will proliferate over time, and by tracking which strategies are
represented most in the population, one can make inferences regarding the adaptiveness of these
strategies in nature. In the learning model, the agents change their behaviour by updating the
probabilities of taking actions as a result of payoffs received. Here, the emergent property of the
model is not which rule performs best, but the actions that are taken as a result of the state of
the environment (the model parameters).
Thesis outline
Coevolution of partner control mechanisms
In the first chapter I study the coevolution of various conditional strategies in pairwise repeated
interactions. For this, I develop an agent-based model where the interacting individuals have
a variety of conditional responses to both cooperators and defectors. The strategy set includes
strategies where individuals respond to defection with defection (positive reciprocity), strategies
that punish defectors (punishment), and strategies that stop interacting with defectors and switch
to a new partner (partner switching). Additionally, combinations of these responses are allowed
(e.g., punish defectors and defect in response to a cooperator), while also allowing the same con-
ditional responses to cooperators. The set of strategies is thus entirely unbiased. By simulating
the evolution of the population where the individuals interact in pairs, I vary the conditions and
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by letting the population evolve I find which strategies (and what conditional responses) are best
adapted to those conditions.
Chapter two is a continuation of the first chapter. With the same basic set-up, I add three
factors that arguably add more realism to the model. These factors are: 1) selective survival of
individuals over successive time steps, resulting in overlap in generations; 2) limited migration of
offspring between demes, resulting in buildup of relatedness within demes; 3) a cognitive cost for
strategies, that correlates with its complexity. In most species there is an obvious overlap of gener-
ations (parents and offspring coexisting at some point in time). Furthermore, offspring are usually
not equally likely to interact with any other individual in the population, but often remain in the
vicinity of their parents and thus will be interacting with closely related individuals (Chapuisat
et al., 1997; Knight et al., 1999). Finally, research has shown that there are cognitive costs associ-
ated with strategies (Mery and Kawecki, 2003, 2004; Kotrschal et al., 2013). In the second chapter
I therefore investigate how these factors in isolation or combined affect the competitiveness of the
different partner control mechanisms: positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching.
Grooming up the hierarchy
In the third chapter I investigate the grooming behaviour in primates, and how grooming patterns
are affected by the ecology of the population. For this, I develop an agent-based model where the
agents (primates) choose whom to groom, where to feed, and whom to tolerate on food patches.
The individuals take actions according to dynamic motivations for the various actions. Since
primates live in highly variable environments (both food patches and the social environment can
vary greatly in a primate’s life), the individuals in the model use learning rules that determine
how motivations are updated. Through learning the individuals update the motivations for the
actions each interaction time step, where the updating depends on the payoff it received in the
previous step. By varying the model parameters (such as the number of available food patches, the
aggressiveness, and more) I investigate how the state of the environment determines the grooming
patterns that emerge.
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Abstract
Cooperation based on mutual investments can occur between unrelated individuals when
they are engaged in repeated interactions. Individuals then need to use a conditional strategy
to deter their interaction partners from defecting. Responding to defection such that the fu-
ture payoff of a defector is reduced relative to cooperating with it is called a partner control
mechanism. Three main partner control mechanisms are (i) to switch from cooperation to
defection when being defected (“positive reciprocity”), (ii) to actively reduce the payoff of a
defecting partner (“punishment”), or (iii) to stop interacting and switch partner (“partner
switching”). However, such mechanisms to stabilize cooperation are often studied in isolation
from each other. In order to better understand the conditions under which each partner con-
trol mechanism tends to be favoured by selection, we here analyse by way of individual-based
simulations the coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching.
We show that random interactions in an unstructured population and a high number of rounds
increase the likelihood that selection favours partner switching. In contrast, interactions local-
ized in small groups (without genetic structure) increase the likelihood that selection favours
punishment and/or positive reciprocity. This study thus highlights the importance of com-
paring different control mechanisms for cooperation under different conditions.
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Introduction
Interactions where all participants gain a direct net fitness benefit, namely cooperation, are
widespread in natural populations (Dugatkin, 1997). Many cases of cooperation involve invest-
ments; that is, the reduction of current personal payoff by some amount in order to increase the
partner’s payoff. This observation raises the question how individuals can ensure that their in-
vestments yield future benefits; that is, how they can avoid being defected by their partner over
repeated bouts of interactions. When individuals engage in repeated interactions over their lifes-
pan, the evolution of cooperation is often modelled as an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game where
individuals have to choose whether to cooperate or defect at each interaction stage. The payoffs are
such that mutual cooperation yields a higher payoff than mutual defection, while to defect yields
a higher payoff than to cooperate in each single round, irrespective of the partner’s action, hence
the dilemma. In order to deter a partner from defecting and stabilizing cooperation in a repeated
game, an individual can use a conditional strategy that reduces a defecting partner’s payoff relative
to that of cooperating with it. We define the broad type of such a conditional response as a partner
control mechanism (Bshary and Bronstein, 2011).
Different types of partner control mechanisms have been proposed to stabilize cooperation in
the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Perhaps the most well known is positive reciprocity, where
cooperative acts are reciprocated by cooperation in future interactions, whereas defection is not,
thus making defection unfavourable in the long run. An often-studied strategy using positive
reciprocity as a partner control mechanism is tit-for-tat (TFT), which starts by cooperating and
then in subsequent rounds implements the previous action of the partner (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981; Kreps et al., 1982; Rubinstein, 1986). Although positive reciprocity is often favoured by
selection in evolutionary models (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Leimar,
1997; Andre´ and Day, 2007), its relevance outside humans has been questioned (Hammerstein,
2003, but see Raihani and Bshary, 2011; Taborsky et al., 2016).
Another partner control mechanism is punishment, which comes at an immediate payoff cost
to the actor, but also reduces the payoff of a defector relative to cooperating (Clutton-Brock and
Parker, 1995; Nakamaru and Iwasa, 2006; Powers et al., 2012). Although punishment thus comes
at a cost to the punisher, this can be overcome if punishment results in the partner being more
cooperative in the long run. Punishment can be favoured by selection in evolutionary models of
repeated interactions (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995), and examples of punishment as a partner
control mechanism can be found in natural populations (reviewed in Raihani et al., 2012).
Still another partner control mechanism is partner switching (Enquist and Leimar, 1993; Joyce
et al., 2006; McNamara et al., 2008; Izquierdo et al., 2010, 2014). By partner switching an individual
can avoid being exploited by a defector by simply stopping the interaction. Although switching
entails an opportunity cost because it necessitates finding a new partner, it has been shown to
be favoured by selection in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game (McNamara et al., 2008), and
several examples of partner switching have been suggested in nature (Cresswell, 1999; Bshary and
Scha¨ffer, 2002; Schwagmeyer, 2014).
For individuals interacting in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game positive reciprocity, pun-
ishment, and partner switching are predicted as main partner control mechanisms capable of sta-
bilizing cooperation (Bshary and Bronstein, 2011). However, the evolution of these three main
types of partner control mechanisms for cooperation is generally investigated in isolation from
each other. It thus remains unclear under which conditions selection will favour one mechanism
over another. More recently, however, different partner control mechanisms have been investigated
together (Joyce et al., 2006; Izquierdo et al., 2010). In a landmark study, Izquierdo et al. (Izquierdo
et al., 2010) have shown that selection favours partner switching over TFT. However, this study
has assumed that switching does not incur any costs, it excluded the strategic option to punish
partners, and restricted the analysis to a population with random interactions only, which are
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all factors that may change which mechanism is favoured by selection. In order to predict which
partner control mechanisms are likely to be observed in natural populations, it is important to con-
sider the coevolution of positive reciprocity, partner switching, and punishment, and understand
the conditions under which one partner control mechanism is favoured over the others by selection.
Here, we present an evolutionary model where we let positive reciprocity, punishment, and
partner switching coevolve when interactions are random in the population and when they occur
in groups in a panmictic population (i.e., no genetic structure within groups, Haystack model of
population structure Maynard Smith, 1964). The aim of this study is to identify the partner control
mechanisms favoured under different conditions, and we therefore chose the Prisoner’s Dilemma as
a payoff matrix for the pairwise interactions, where defection always yields a higher single round
payoff, and thus selection for responding to defection is strong. We explore the role of the proximate
costs and benefits of cooperation, punishment, and switching on these dynamics, as well as the
role of interactions localized to groups and the duration of punishment. Our results show that,
when interactions occur at random between all population members, the likelihood that partner
switching is favoured by selection increases if the number of interactions in an individual’s lifespan
increases. However, when interactions are localized to groups, we find that punishment generally
dominates in sizable groups, unless punishment efficiency is reduced. In the latter case, we do find
conditions where positive reciprocity outcompetes alternative partner control mechanisms, but we
were unable to identify a particular factor that would consistently favour it.
The model
Population and lifecycle
We consider a haploid population of constant size with a total number of N = d × n adult
individuals, which are subdivided into d groups of equal size n. The lifecycle is marked by the
following events. First, group members interact socially with each other and accumulate payoffs.
Next, each individual produces a large number of offspring proportionally to accumulated payoff,
and dies. Finally, offspring disperse randomly (with probability 1/d to a given group, including the
natal one) and compete randomly with exactly n individuals reaching adulthood in each group.
Hence, the population is panmictic (no genetic structure will be obtained).
Social interactions
In the social interaction phase of the lifecycle, individuals play a repeated game for T rounds,
whose stage game consists of a pairwise extensive-form game (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996 for
a description of different types of games). The per-round extensive-form game consists of five
sequential moves where the individuals of a pair choose actions simultaneously during each move
(Fig. 1), and where pair rematching may occur during each round, as follows.
Move 0: random pairing. Each unpaired individual (all individuals in the first round) gets
randomly paired with another unpaired individual. Individuals cannot influence this process, i.e.,
there is no partner choice.
Move 1: the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each individual in a pair can either cooperate (action C) or
defect (action D). To cooperate means paying a payoff cost Ch to contribute a payoff benefit Bh
to the partner, whereas defection has no effect on payoff.
Move 2: leaving. Each individual can either leave its partner (action L) or stay (action S) and a
pairbond is broken if at least one individual leaves. A payoff cost of Cl is paid by both individuals
of a broken pair and only unbroken pairs are engaged in the forthcoming move 3 and 4, otherwise,
individuals are added to a pool of individuals that will be paired in move 0 of the next round.
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Move 3: punishment. Each individual in a pair can either opt to punish its partner (action P)
or not punish (action N). Playing action P incurs a payoff cost Cp to self and reduces by Dp the
payoff of the partner. Only punished individuals enter the next move.
Move 4: response to punishment. A punished individual has three possible (re)actions available.
(i) It receives the punishment but “ignores” it and does not change any future action if the pairbond
is maintained (action I). (ii) The individual leaves its partner, namely it expresses action L as in
move 2 with the same payoff consequences. (iii) The individual alters its behaviour (action A),
which means that, if it played action D (C) in move 1, it will cooperate (defect) in the next z rounds
in move 1. An individual that has switched to defection (cooperation) owing to punishment and
is punished again, will again change its behaviour in move 1 for z rounds.
In addition to a fixed cost Cl of partner switching, we also consider an alternative cost function
for individuals that leave (or were left) in either move 2 or 4, where the cost depends on the number
of unpaired individuals at the end of a round. For this, we consider the function
Cl(i) =
a
1 + ik
, (1)
which decreases as the number i of unpaired individuals in the population increases, where a > 0
determines the maximum cost, and k > 0 the shape. Thus, we assume that if a larger number of
individuals is searching for a partner, then the cost of finding a partner is reduced.
Strategies
We assume that individuals use pure strategies, which deterministically specify the actions to be
taken at moves 1-4 of the stage game, possibly conditionally on past actions. The strategy of an
individual for the entire game is specified by a vector s = (x1, x2, x3, x4), where xk represents the
move-wise strategy the individual uses when faced with a choice at move k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
In the supplementary material, table S1, we list all move-wise strategies, which are obtained
as follows. We assume that the strategy for move 1 specifies an action taken when the individual
first interacts with its partner, and an action taken in subsequent rounds is conditioned on what
the partner did in the previous round in move 1. This move-wise strategy can thus be written as
a1aCaD, where a1, aC, aD ∈ {C,D}. Here, a1 is the action taken the first time the two individuals
in a pair interact, aC is the action taken if the partner cooperated in the previous round, and aD
is the action taken if the partner defected in the previous round. We thus have a total of 8 (23)
move-wise strategies for move 1: {CCC, CCD, CDC, CDD, DCC, DCD, DDC, DDD}.
For move 2, the decision to leave or stay is assumed to be conditional on the action taken by
the partner in move 1 of the current round. Hence, the move-wise strategy can be written as aCaD,
where aC ∈ {L,S} (aD ∈ {L,S}) gives the action taken when the partner cooperated (defected),
whereby x2 ∈ {LL,LS,SL,SS}.
Likewise, for move 3, the decision to punish or not to punish the partner is assumed to be
conditional on the action taken by the partner in move 1, so that the move-wise strategy is aCaD,
where aC ∈ {P,N} (aD ∈ {P,N}) is the action taken when the partner cooperated (defected),
whereby x3 ∈ {PP,PN,NP,NN}. Importantly though, we assume that if an individual punishes
its partner in this move and the pair is not broken in the next move, then the individual expresses
in move 1 of the next round the same action it expressed in this round. This is assumed to avoid
individuals responding to the action of the partner both by punishing and by (possibly) changing
their own action in move 1 of the following round, and thus take two conditional actions as a
response to one action of its partner. Because we want to compare strategies that differ in their
response to defecting individuals, we did not allow individuals that punish in the current round to
take a conditional action in move 1 of the following round. Finally, the response to punishment in
move 4 is simply given by x4 ∈ {I,A,L}.
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Removing phenotypically indistinguishable strategies
As there are eight different alternatives for x1, 4 for x2 and x3, 3 for x4 (see supplementary material,
table S1), there is a total of 384 strategies. However, given the setup of our model, many strategies
in the strategy space are phenotypically indistinguishable. By phenotypically indistinguishable
strategies, we mean those strategies that at no point in the game would act differently from one
another, and so will be neutral in an evolutionary model. Therefore, to decrease the complexity
of the model, we removed strategies from the strategy space as follows. Per set of phenotypically
indistinguishable strategies, only one strategy was used. For example, consider the set of strategies
with the same move-wise strategy for move 1 (e.g., x1 = CCC) and that always leaves the partner in
move 2 (x2 = LL). Strategies from this set never reach move 3 and 4, and thus will always behave
similarly, despite having different move-wise strategies for these moves. The 92 strategies that
remain after removing phenotypically indistinguishable strategies are shown in the supplementary
material (table S3).
Pooling strategies into classes
Although there are many strategies in the model, we are mainly interested in cooperative strategies
that differ in their response to defection, i.e., cooperative strategies using different partner control
mechanisms. A cooperative strategy is defined as a strategy that, when paired with another
cooperative strategy, will always cooperate in move 1 of the game, without punishing or leaving the
partner. Within the set of cooperative strategies, we can distinguish between classes of strategies
that differ in their partner control mechanism: no response (no control), conditional play in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (move 1), leaving (move 2), or punishment (move 3). Each of these four classes
consists of three strategies that differ only in their response to punishment (move 4). Because we
are interested in comparing partner control mechanisms, when comparing frequencies of strategies,
we will do so according to class, i.e., in our analysis, we will always pool the frequencies of the
strategies belonging to the same class.
Here, we will give a verbal description of each of the six classes of strategies that we consider
(supplementary material, table S2). Each strategy of the positive reciprocity class (denoted Rc)
cooperates on the first interaction. It cooperates in subsequent rounds if the partner cooperated
in the previous round and defects if the partner defected in the previous round, without leaving
or punishing the partner. Each strategy of the partner switching class (denoted Sc) cooperates
on the first round, cooperates if the partner cooperates, does not punish, but leaves as soon as
the partner defects. Each strategy of the punishment class (denoted Pc) cooperates on the first
round, cooperates in subsequent rounds, does not leave, but punishes a partner that defects.
Each strategy of the always cooperate (denoted Cc) and always defect class (denoted Dc) always
cooperates (defects), and does not express any conditional play in move 1-3. The remaining
92− 5× 3 = 77 strategies will be pooled in “rest”.
Analyses
In order to analyse the model, we used individual-based simulations to track the frequencies of
the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and “rest”) in the population over generations.
Strategies are assumed to be inherited from parent to offspring with probability 1 − µ. With
probability µ, the offspring mutates to another strategy taken at random among all remaining
strategies. To form the next generation of offspring, we use multinomial sampling over the aggregate
payoff of each strategy type of the parental generation with a baseline payoff guaranteeing there
can be no negative payoff (Wright-Fisher process, Ewens, 2004).
For all reported results (Figs. 2 and 3), we ran the simulations for 106 generations and computed
the time average frequency of the six classes of strategies starting with uniformly sampled initial
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frequencies. We also evaluated the total frequency of cooperation in the population, which we
define as the average frequency over the whole population and length of the repeated game of
the pairs of individuals in the population where both individuals in the pair cooperated in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Results
We first present results assuming that the population consists of a single group (d = 1, n = 10000),
so that the pairing process (move 0, Fig. 1) is random at the population level. We will refer to
this as the well-mixed case. Then, we introduce group structure (d = 250, varying n), where the
pairing process occurs at the group level but with otherwise similar parameters to show how this
factor alters the relative effectiveness of each partner control mechanism.
Well-mixed population
Our results are based on the following baseline parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp =
1, Cl = 1, µ = 0.01, whereas we let T vary between 1 and 30 (table 1) and set z = T , so that
the behavioural change after punishment lasts indefinitely. We find that the average frequency of
cooperation in the population is strongly dependent on the number of rounds (T ) per generation
(Fig. 2a, black line). When the game is one shot (T = 1), conditional strategies are unable to
affect payoff or behaviour in future rounds, and thus cooperation is selected against (less than
1%), which is consistent with the standard result that defection is favoured in such cases (Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981). As the number of rounds is increased, the frequency of cooperation quickly
increases, with more than 90% of mutual cooperation for T ≥ 6.
Additionally, we find that the number of rounds has a strong influence on which partner control
mechanism is favoured by selection. Our main results are as follows.
For 4 ≤ T ≤ 6, we find that the positive reciprocity class (Rc) is dominant (Fig. 2a). Here,
the number of rounds is very low, and thus the costs of punishment or partner switching in the
first rounds cannot be negated in later rounds of mutual cooperation. Switching to defection to
minimize payoff losses is more beneficial for the lifetime payoff and thus the Rc class is selected
for.
For intermediate T (7 ≤ T ≤ 9), we find that the punishment class (Pc) dominates (Fig. 2a).
Although Rc and Pc strategies gain equal payoffs when paired with each other, their respective
payoff gain will differ considerably when paired with a defector. An Rc strategy switches to
defection when paired with a defector resulting in both players gaining the baseline payoff. A Pc
strategy, however, continues to cooperate while punishing defection. If the recipient of punishment
switches to play cooperate, then through several rounds of mutual cooperation, a Pc strategy is
likely to obtain more payoff than an Rc strategy. This difference in payoff between Rc and Pc when
matched with defectors may thus explain why for a higher number of rounds of interaction selection
will favour the Pc class over the Rc class. However, not all strategies respond to punishment
by altering behaviour, and thus Pc strategies cannot force all individuals to cooperate. Some
partnerships can therefore be very costly for these individuals as they pay double costs (cooperating
and punishing).
Finally, for large T (T ≥ 10), we find that the switching class (Sc) dominates the population
(Fig. 2a). Strategies in the Sc class do not face the problem of prolonged costly partnerships as
they will always leave uncooperative individuals. Two Sc strategies will therefore always manage
to find each other in a well-mixed population, given enough rounds. When the number of rounds
increases, Sc strategies will have more rounds to reap the benefits of mutual cooperation once a
cooperative partner has been found, and thus the Sc class outcompetes both the Rc and the Pc
class for T ≥ 10. If the cost of switching is increased to Cl = 5, however, then the number of rounds
16
needed for the Sc class to dominate is increased to T ≥ 70 (Fig. 2b). In all simulations where d = 1
(single group), we find that switching is generally favoured when T is large enough. The finding
that a high number of rounds favours partner switching is robust even when the cost of switching
increases exponentially with fewer number of unpaired individuals (using eq. 1, a = 100, k = 0.9,
Fig. 2c; see the supplementary material, Fig. S2 for other parameter values).
Group structured population
We now introduce group structure (without genetic structure as dispersal is random to any group)
into the population, setting the number of groups (d) to 250 while varying group size (n). Other-
wise, we use the same set of parameter values as in the baseline case for the well-mixed population
(Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, µ = 0.01, Fig. 2a) with T = 30 and z = T . Our main aim
is to determine the conditions where the Sc class dominates in frequency.
Interestingly, switching only dominates in very large groups (n ≥ 300, Fig. 3a). Instead, we
find that the Pc class is dominant for any group size lower than 300. The Pc class coexists in these
simulations with a strategy that always defects, punishes other defectors, and alters behaviour if
punished. While the Pc individuals can force such individuals to cooperate, other strategies will
either be exploited or punished.
To determine the robustness of the result that the Pc class tends to dominate in a group
structured population, we relaxed the assumption of punishment altering behaviour for the lifetime
of the individual (in move 4). Such a strong effect of punishment is unlikely to occur in nature,
and punished individuals may attempt to defect again after several interactions. We find that the
evolutionary success of punishment is strongly dependent on this parameter. If z = 5, then the Pc
class is still dominant in groups up to a size of 52 (Fig. 3b). In larger groups however, it is first
the Rc class that dominates, whereas for n ≥ 76, the Sc class is dominant. Strikingly, if the cost
of switching partner is absent as well (Cl = 0), the Sc class is still outcompeted by the Pc class in
small groups (n ≤ 28, Fig. 3c). This may stem from the fact that if individuals interact in small
groups, a partner switcher may be rematched with the individual it left on the previous round and
may end up repeatedly interacting with the same defector (despite switching every round). The
Pc class therefore still dominates in small groups, because its payoff is mostly dependent on how
a defecting individual responds to punishment, but not on the composition of the group it is in.
This effect largely persists in a structured population if T is small, unless the cost of punishment
is doubled, in which case the Rc class takes over (supplementary material, Fig. S4).
Sensitivity analysis
To test the robustness of the various results presented here, we have performed additional analyses
testing a larger part of the parameter space adding up to at least 15000 different parameter
combinations for which we have run simulations. The results of these analyses are presented
in the supplementary material.
Discussion
Cooperative individuals can use partner control mechanisms; that is, broad types of conditional
strategies to reduce the lifetime payoff of defectors relative to cooperators. Three partner control
mechanisms (positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching) have all been shown to be
able to stabilize cooperation in panmictic populations in separate models (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981; Garc´ıa and Traulsen, 2012; Izquierdo et al., 2014). However, few studies have investigated
under which conditions selection would favour one partner control mechanism over another. Here,
we have addressed this issue by investigating the coevolution of these three control mechanisms in
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a panmictic population in which the interaction structure is either well-mixed (i.e., all individuals
are potential partners) or group structured with interactions occurring only locally among a small
number of individuals (with no genetic structure within groups). In most simulations, we find a
polymorphism where the different classes of strategies coexist. However, it is clear that under most
conditions a specific class of strategies tends to be favoured by selection over alternatives and thus
dominates in this polymorphism.
Our key result for the well-mixed case is that the likelihood of partner switching being favoured
by selection over positive reciprocity, punishment, and defection increases if the number of rounds
of interaction is larger (Fig. 2 and supplementary material, Figs. S1-S3). For fewer number of
rounds punishment and positive reciprocity tend to be favoured, but which of the two classes
dominates depends on changes in various parameters, and thus no general conclusion can be reached
here. When interactions are localized to the group level, punishment is relatively more favoured
in small and moderately sized groups for otherwise similar parameter values as in the well-mixed
interactions case, and this is for both small and large number of rounds (Figs. 3a and S4a). Positive
reciprocity dominates under certain conditions in a group structured population when punishment
efficiency is reduced; for example, for a high number of rounds, intermediate group size, and a
low duration of the effect of punishment (Fig. 3b), or for a low number of rounds and high cost
of punishment (supplementary material, Fig. S4c). We did not, however, identify a specific factor
that would consistently induce positive reciprocity to dominate the other control mechanisms. In
the following, we will first discuss each control mechanism separately and then evaluate how our
results connect to empirical research.
Switching
In our analysis, partner switching emerges as the dominant partner control mechanism when many
potential partners exist and many interactions take place during an individuals lifespan, unless
the cost of switching is high and the number of rounds of interaction is insufficiently large to
compensate for these costs. These results make intuitive sense if one considers how the three
control mechanisms respond to unconditional defectors: punishers and positive reciprocators may
spend their entire life with a defecting partner, whereas partner switchers leave and will invariably
end up with another cooperative individual and hence reap the benefits of cooperation as long as
enough rounds are played. Izquierdo et al. (2010) have already shown that partner switching is a
powerful partner control mechanism stabilizing cooperation; if it is cost-free, then it dominates over
positive reciprocity. Our results extend their insights by showing that switching can be favoured
by selection over not only positive reciprocity, but also punishment in a well-mixed population,
with the caveat that a sufficient number of rounds of interaction must take place.
Switching (when linked to cooperation) is a cognitively simple strategy that, via the exploration
of partner behaviour, rejects defectors and tends to assort with cooperators. It can thus be re-
garded as a primitive form of partner choice. Although more active mechanisms of partner choice
exist, such as using information about past behaviour of individuals or other signals of cooperative
behaviour (Ashlock et al., 1996; Janssen, 2008), partner switching allows individuals to respond to
variation in the population in the same way. This generally tends to stabilize cooperation because,
if individuals can exert some level of choice in the presence of variation of the expression of coop-
eration, the system of interacting individuals functions as a biological market where cooperators
end up assorted with themselves (Johnstone and Bshary, 2008; McNamara and Leimar, 2010).
A critical result of our model, however, is that the size of the interaction group has a clear
impact on the likelihood of a partner switcher to find the right partner, and thus the evolutionary
success of partner switching. Relaxing the assumption of well-mixed interaction opportunities
(McNamara et al., 2008; Izquierdo et al., 2010), we find that the prevalence of partner switching
diminishes the smaller the number of potential interaction partners gets. This conclusion holds
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even if partner switching is free of opportunity costs (Fig. 3c). The reason for this result is that
the smaller the group the more likely it becomes that switchers can only be rematched with their
defecting partner as nobody else is available. In other words, the market for interaction partners
becomes increasingly restricted with decreasing numbers of potential interaction partners.
Punishment
Via punishment an individual can actively attempt to change the behaviour of its partner, by pay-
ing a small payoff cost to reduce the payoff of its defecting partner, thereby making cooperation
more attractive. Punishment is more favoured when the population is group structured (compared
with unstructured), up to relatively large group sizes, especially if punishment results in the de-
fecting recipient changing its behaviour to cooperation indefinitely (z = T , Fig. 3a). Importantly,
a punisher can induce cooperative behaviour in a conditionally defecting partner but switchers
cannot, which gives punishment an advantage when the number of potential partners and hence
the number of unmatched cooperators is limited. For the same reason, punishment outcompetes
positive reciprocity for various parameter value combinations, because within the limits of the
strategy space explored in this paper, the behaviour of the partner and focal individual can be
more easily aligned through punishment than through positive reciprocity. Therefore, we find in
group structured populations that selection generally favours punishment over positive reciprocity
and partner switching in sizable groups (Fig. 3). If one of the parameters influencing punishment
efficiency is changed (i.e., high cost of punishment, low payoff reduction for the recipient of pun-
ishment, or short behavioural change after being punished), then we find that alternative classes
of strategies dominate (supplementary material, Fig. S5).
Positive reciprocity
The conditions where positive reciprocity is favoured over punishment and partner switching are
less easily characterized. Although in group structured populations we find that punishment dom-
inates often in sizable groups (Fig. 3), when punishment efficiency is decreased, there are various
conditions where positive reciprocity dominates instead (Fig. 3b, and supplementary material,
Figs. S4 and S5). However, depending on the number of rounds of interaction, cost of part-
ner switching, and other parameters we also find conditions where the always defect class or the
switching class dominates in the population (supplementary material, Fig. S5). In sum, there is not
a specific factor that would consistently increase the likelihood of positive reciprocity dominating
the population.
Our analyses suggest thatRc strategies may often be outcompeted by other control mechanisms,
because Rc individuals paired with defectors are unable to reach the cooperative outcome (both
individuals play C in move 1). That is, there exists no strategy in our strategy set that would
exploit unconditional cooperators, but that can also “identify” the Rc strategy and cooperate with
it. Such strategies would require several rounds of interaction (and thus a large memory) to identify
that the partner is playing TFT. Punishment, on the other hand, is a much more direct signal
(a single punishing act) to which defectors can respond. Thus, if strategy complexity is limited
to one round of memory, then the Sc and Pc class can still reach the cooperative outcome when
paired with a defector, but the Rc class cannot. Therefore, even though the Rc class avoids being
exploited by defectors by switching to play defect as well, it gains less payoff than other classes
of control mechanisms and is thus frequently outcompeted. This does not necessarily mean that
positive reciprocity can never be favoured. As the results show, we have found conditions where
positive reciprocity dominates (Figs. 2a and 3b, and supplementary material). More importantly,
however, our results show that the deterministic play and a single round of memory of our Rc class
(as in the TFT strategy) causes it to often be outcompeted by classes of strategies that do manage
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to reach a cooperative outcome with their partners. Therefore, for positive reciprocity to evolve, it
is likely necessary that strategies evolve that take into account a larger history of the interaction
or play less deterministically.
Connection to the empirical literature
It is still a largely unanswered question of how frequently each of the three partner control mech-
anisms investigated here occurs in natural populations. According to current evidence, there are
very few examples for punishment (Raihani et al., 2012), while there are various examples for
positive reciprocity (Taborsky et al., 2016). Regarding partner switching, we are aware only of
clear interspecific examples where partner switching in response to defection occurs. For example,
in an interspecific interaction between client and cleaner fish, it has been observed that client
reef fish with access to several cleaning stations use a partner switching strategy in response to a
defecting client even though they could alternatively use punishment - as clients without choice
options do (Bshary and Scha¨ffer, 2002; Bshary and Grutter, 2005). Our model is, however, limited
to intraspecific interactions, and thus it remains to be investigated how much our results would
be affected if interacting individuals belong to two separate gene pools. In intraspecific contexts,
empirical tests of biological market theory focus on individuals actively choosing a partner prior
to interactions based on a comparison of offers (Noe¨ et al., 1991; Hammerstein and Noe¨, 2016),
rather than on leaving a partner that has defected. Investigating active choice rather than partner
switching would be another interesting avenue for future research.
Our result that partner switching does not perform well in small groups (and hence for low
behavioural variation) is of potential importance for empirical research on cooperation in stable
groups, as is often found in primates. It has been proposed that various trades of investments
in primates (e.g., grooming, tolerance, and support in agonistic encounters) are stable against
defection partially because of partner switching (Schino and Aureli, 2016). However, it has also
been argued that social bonds in primate groups are highly differentiated where individuals form
long-term social bonds with particular individuals in the group (Silk et al., 2009). In such groups,
partner switching may be highly restricted. Hence, our model suggests that partner switching
cannot be accepted as a default partner control mechanism in stable groups without convincing
empirical evidence.
The most surprising result of our analyses is the success of punishment in sizable groups, as
the evidence for this partner control mechanism in symmetric two-player interactions is rather
rare (Raihani et al., 2012). One reason for its success is the assumption that any player can use
punishment in a relative cost-efficient way, i.e., the cost of punishing is lower than the cost of
being punished. In nature, cost efficiency is likely linked to asymmetries between players and
hence asymmetric games. Fittingly, experimental evidence for punishment has been reported for
asymmetric games in interspecific interactions (Bshary and Grutter, 2005; Bshary and Bshary,
2010), and the most important intraspecific context involves the “pay-to-stay” concept where
helpers help and show appeasement apparently to avoid aggression by dominant breeders (Fischer
et al., 2014). A major problem with asymmetric strength is that it may turn a cooperation
game in which punishment stabilizes cooperation into an exploitation game in which dominants
coerce subordinates (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995), i.e., defect while forcing the partner to
cooperate. For example, only larger male cleaner wrasse punish their smaller female partners
for cheating a joint client, a game akin to an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Bshary et al., 2008;
Raihani et al., 2010). To fully understand the effect of asymmetries between individuals on the
relative effectiveness of punishment over other partner control mechanisms, this will need to be
modelled explicitly, however. In addition, further work is needed to determine how factors such as
asymmetries or relatedness between interacting individuals may change the adaptiveness of each
partner control mechanism.
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Table and figures
Table 1: List of parameters
Parameter Meaning
Bh benefit to the recipient of a cooperative act
Ch cost of a cooperative act
Dp payoff reduction for target of punishment
Cp cost of punishment
Cl cost of switching partner
z duration of punishment
d number of groups
n group size
T number of rounds in one generation
µ mutation rate
N population size
a, k used to calculate the cost of switching in eq. 1
Figure 1: Chain of events per generation. The five moves are repeated for T rounds. After looping
T times, the next generation is produced and the parental one dies.
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Figure 2: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperation (black
line) and the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and “rest”) plotted as a function of the
number of rounds T of the repeated game. Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, z =
T, µ = 0.01, d = 1, n = 10000. Panel specific parameters: Cl = 1 (panel a), Cl = 5 (panel b), using
eq. 1 with a = 100, k = 0.9 (panel c).
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Figure 3: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperation (black
line) and the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and “rest”) plotted as a function of group
size n. Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, T = 30, µ = 0.01, d = 250. Panel
specific parameters: Cl = 1, z = T (panel a), Cl = 1, z = 5 (panel b), Cl = 0, z = 5 (panel c).
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Supplementary material
Strategy set
In table S1 the move-wise strategies for each move of the stage game are listed, while table S2 lists
the main classes of strategies.
In table S3 the full set of strategies is given. In the “Strategies” section of the main text the
coding of the strategies is explained. Although the setup of our model allows for a great number
of strategies, we have reduced the strategy space by removing phenotypically indistinguishable
strategies (see also main text section “Removing phenotypically indistinguishable strategies”). For
example, if the strategy specifies to always leave in move 2, regardless of the partner’s action, it
can never punish the partner, since the pair will be broken up and thus the actions specified for
this move (punish or not punish) will never be played. Some strategies are therefore phenotypically
indistinguishable in our model, and per set of phenotypically indistinguishable strategies only one
strategy was used in the strategy space.
An X in a move-wise strategy in table S3 is a placeholder for a conditional action that is not
played at any point during the game (C or D in move 1; P or N in move 3). Two strategies that
are otherwise similar, but differing in this action would therefore never act differently (i.e., they
are phenotypically indistinguishable). Only one of these two strategies is included in the strategy
space. This can occur in two situations. First, if an individual leaves after the partner cooperates
(or defects), then it cannot also punish or conditionally cooperate/defect in the following round
since the pair is broken up, and thus an X is shown in place of the conditional action in both
the move-wise strategy for move 1 and 3. Second, we assumed that a punishing act could not be
followed by a conditional action in move 1 of the following round, and thus the action P in the
move-wise strategy for move 3 is always combined with an X in the move-wise strategy for move
1.
Sensitivity analysis
Parameter exploration in a well-mixed population
To test the robustness of our main result (the Sc class dominates for high T ), we explored the
parameter space more thoroughly than presented in the main text. The exploration was done as
follows. The parameters Bh and Dp were set either to 2, 2.5, or 3, the parameters Ch and Cp were
set either to 0.5, 1, or 1.5, and the cost of leaving (Cl) was set either to 0, 1, or 2. For each possible
combination of these parameters we ran simulations with the number of rounds T ranging from 1
to 100.
In Fig. S1 the results for four combinations of parameters are shown. If the Bh/Ch ratio is
low (Bh/Ch = 2/1.5, panel a), we find that a higher number of rounds is required to reach high
levels of cooperation compared to the baseline case (cf. main text Fig. 2a). Here, the Sc class is
the dominant class of cooperative strategies. If the Bh/Ch ratio is high (Bh/Ch = 3/0.5, panel
b), only a few number of rounds is required for high levels of cooperation. The Sc dominates here
for T ≥ 3. If there is no cost of leaving (Cl = 0, panel c), the Sc class is always the dominant
cooperative class of strategies. If punishment is very effective in terms of payoff, i.e., the Dp/Cp
ratio is high (Dp/Cp = 3/0.5, panel d), the Pc class dominates for a larger range of T , compared
to our baseline case (main text). However, for T > 40 the Sc class is again often found to be
dominant.
In short, for any parameter combination we find that, all else being equal, the relative compet-
itiveness of the Sc class increases with increasing number of rounds.
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Dynamic cost of leaving: In this section we investigate additional parameter values for a and
k when using eq. 1 from the main text to calculate the cost of leaving. The results are plotted
in Fig. S2. Again we find that, although the exact number of rounds where the Sc class becomes
dominant depends both on a and k, the Sc class will always dominate for high T . This suggests
that the Sc class can evolve irrespective of the underlying cost function.
Large T : To check to what extent the Sc class dominates for large T , we ran simulations with T
up to 1000, while otherwise using our baseline set of parameters. We find that, although the Sc class
is by far the most prevalent, other classes of cooperative strategies are maintained above frequencies
higher than what would be expected from the mutation rate alone (Fig. S3). This results from
the fact that the classes of cooperative strategies are nearly neutral in a population consisting of
mainly those classes (Cc, Rc, Sc, and Pc), since these strategies will gain exactly the same payoff
when paired with one another. Therefore, through genetic drift the different cooperative strategies
may invade one another. However, uncooperative individuals will continue to enter the population
via mutation. When paired with uncooperative individuals the cooperative strategies will respond
differently, and thus gain different payoffs. Here, strategies of the Cc class will then be strongly
selected against, but also strategies of the Rc and Pc class gain less payoff on average than those
of the Sc class. Thus, through a mutation-selection-drift balance this polymorphism is maintained
in the population.
Parameter exploration in a group-structured population
In this section we present additional results for the group-structured case.
Group-structure with small T : In this section, we tested if the Pc class is also relatively more
favoured by selection in a structured population if T is small. For T = 4 in the well-mixed case the
Rc class dominates the population (Fig. 2a). Using the same parameters as in the well-mixed case
(except T = 4, d = 250, varying n), we find again that the Pc class is relatively more favoured by
selection (Fig. S4a). Only in very large groups the Rc class outcompetes the Pc class (n ≥ 350).
Interestingly, reducing Dp (the payoff reduction of being punished) did not affect the frequency
of the Pc class, but instead negatively affected the frequency of the Rc class (Dp = 1.2, Fig. S4b).
This was due to Pc strategies having less impact on various defector strategies, which consequently
increased in frequency, which in turn negatively affected the Rc class, but not the Pc class. How-
ever, when increasing the cost of punishment (Cp) the Pc class disappeared from the population
and the Rc class dominated for all but the smallest groups (Cp = 2, n ≥ 16, Fig. S4c). This
discrepancy with Dp is due to Cp affecting the payoff of the Pc class directly, while changing Dp
affects recipients of punishment instead.
Further parameter exploration: In this section we present results from a larger parameter
space for the group-structured population.
First, we determined the minimum group size where the Sc class dominates in conditions where
the Pc is not dominant. To achieve this we used the same parameters as in Fig. 3c from the
main text with z = 3. Using these parameters we find that the Pc class no longer dominates, and
instead the “rest” class and the Rc class dominate in small groups (Fig. S5a). The Sc class is
now dominant in the population for n ≥ 20 (compared to n ≥ 32 for z = 5 in Fig. 3c in the main
text). Thus, even in unfavourable conditions for the Pc class, the Sc class does not dominate in
populations where interactions occur in small groups.
In Fig. S5b we use the same parameters as in panel a, but with Cl = 1, T = 7 in order to
determine if the Sc class can dominate in a group-structured population when T is low. However,
we find here, similarly to our well-mixed population (Fig. 2a main text), that if T is low the Sc
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class is outcompeted by the Pc and Rc classes for group size smaller than 120, and by the Dc class
in larger groups. This confirms that the Sc class needs a critical number of rounds in order to be
favoured by selection over the other classes.
In Fig. S5c we use the same parameters as Fig. 4b from the main text, with Dp = 1. This
shows that, although reducing Dp initially affects only the frequency of the Sc and Rc classes
(main text), if Dp is too low then the Pc disappears completely from the population and the Dc
class is dominant for all group sizes.
In Fig. S5d we use the same parameters as in Fig. 4c from the main text, but with T = 7. In the
well-mixed population we have found that a higher number of rounds generally favours the Pc class
over the Rc class. Similarly, in Fig. 4c (main text) we find the Rc class dominates if punishment
is costly to the punisher (Cp = 2). However, if the number of rounds is increased, then we find
that the Pc is dominant for group size n ≤ 60. This confirms that also in the a group-structured
population, all else being equal, a higher number of rounds increases the relative competitiveness
of the Pc class over the Rc class.
Coevolution of the Pc class and response to punishment
In this section we show that the response to punishment by altering behaviour (x4 = A) co-evolves
with the Pc class. To demonstrate this we used the same data as our baseline case (main text
Fig. 2a), but pooled the time average frequency of all strategies into three groups, based on their
response to punishment (ignore, alter, or leave) (Fig. S6). The frequency of each group is plotted
together with the frequency of the Pc class. The results show that if Pc strategies are frequent,
then strategies that alter behaviour after punishment (x4 = A) are also selected for.
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Table S 1: The sets of move-wise strategies for each move of the stage game. The coding of
strategies is explained in the “Strategies” section.
Move 1: {CCC,CCD,CDC,CDD,DCC,DCD,DDC,DDD}
Move 2: {LL,SS,LS,SL}
Move 3: {PP,NN,PN,NP}
Move 4: {I,A,L}
Table S 2: Main classes of strategies.
Name Move 1 Move 2 Move 3 Move 4
Always cooperate Cc CCC SS NN {I,A,L}
Positive reciprocity Rc CCD SS NN {I,A,L}
Partner switching Sc CCC SL NN {I,A,L}
Punishment Pc CCC SS NP {I,A,L}
Always defect Dc DDD SS NN {I,A,L}
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Table S 3: Full set of strategies used in all simulations. The coding is explained in the main text.
Strategy Move 1 Move 2 Move 3 Move 4 Strategy Move 1 Move 2 Move 3 Move 4
1 CCC SS NN I 47 DCC SS NN I
2 CCC SS NN A 48 DCC SS NN A
3 CCC SS NN L 49 DCC SS NN L
4 CCD SS NN I 50 DCD SS NN I
5 CCD SS NN A 51 DCD SS NN A
6 CCD SS NN L 52 DCD SS NN L
7 CCX SL NX I 53 DCX SL NX I
8 CCX SL NX A 54 DCX SL NX A
9 CCX SL NX L 55 DCX SL NX L
10 CCX SS NP I 56 DCX SS NP I
11 CCX SS NP A 57 DCX SS NP A
12 CCX SS NP L 58 DCX SS NP L
13 CDC SS NN I 59 DDC SS NN I
14 CDC SS NN A 60 DDC SS NN A
15 CDC SS NN L 61 DDC SS NN L
16 CDD SS NN I 62 DDD SS NN I
17 CDD SS NN A 63 DDD SS NN A
18 CDD SS NN L 64 DDD SS NN L
19 CDX SL NX I 65 DDX SL NX I
20 CDX SL NX A 66 DDX SL NX A
21 CDX SL NX L 67 DDX SL NX L
22 CDX SS NP I 68 DDX SS NP I
23 CDX SS NP A 69 DDX SS NP A
24 CDX SS NP L 70 DDX SS NP L
25 CXC LS XN I 71 DXC LS XN I
26 CXC LS XN A 72 DXC LS XN A
27 CXC LS XN L 73 DXC LS XN L
28 CXD LS XN I 74 DXD LS XN I
29 CXD LS XN A 75 DXD LS XN A
30 CXD LS XN L 76 DXD LS XN L
31 CXX LL XX I 77 DXX LL XX I
32 CXX LS XP I 78 DXX LS XP I
33 CXX LS XP A 79 DXX LS XP A
34 CXX LS XP L 80 DXX LS XP L
35 CXC SS PN I 81 DXC SS PN I
36 CXC SS PN A 82 DXC SS PN A
37 CXC SS PN L 83 DXC SS PN L
38 CXD SS PN I 84 DXD SS PN I
39 CXD SS PN A 85 DXD SS PN A
40 CXD SS PN L 86 DXD SS PN L
41 CXX SL PX I 87 DXX SL PX I
42 CXX SL PX A 88 DXX SL PX A
43 CXX SL PX L 89 DXX SL PX L
44 CXX SS PP I 90 DXX SS PP I
45 CXX SS PP A 91 DXX SS PP A
46 CXX SS PP L 92 DXX SS PP L
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Figure S 1: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperation (black
line) and the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and “rest”) plotted as a function of the
number of rounds T of the repeated game. Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp =
1, Cl = 1, z = T, µ = 0.01, d = 1, n = 10000. Panel specific parameters: Ch = 1.5 (panel a),
Bh = 3, Ch = 0.5 (panel b), Cl = 0 (panel c), Dp = 3, Cp = 0.5 (panel d).
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Figure S 2: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperation (black
line) and the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and “rest”) plotted as a function of the
number of rounds T of the repeated game. Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp =
1, z = T, µ = 0.01, d = 1, n = 10000, using eq. 1 to calculate the cost of switching. Panel specific
parameters: a = 50, k = 0.8 (panel a), a = 100, k = 0.8 (panel b), a = 100, k = 1 (panel c).
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Figure S 3: Same as the baseline case (Fig. 2a, main text) but with a high number of rounds T .
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Figure S 4: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperation (black
line) and the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and “rest”) plotted as a function of group
size n. Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Cl = 1, T = 4, z = T, µ = 0.01, d = 250. Panel specific
parameters: Dp = 2, Cp = 1 (panel a), Dp = 1.2, Cp = 1 (panel b), Dp = 2, Cp = 2 (panel c)
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Figure S 5: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperation (black
line) and the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and “rest”) plotted as a function of
group size n. Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, µ = 0.01, d = 250. Panel specific parameters:
Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 0, T = 30, z = 3 (panel a), Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, T = 7, z = 3 (panel b),
Dp = 1, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, T = 4, z = T (panel c), Dp = 2, Cp = 2, Cl = 1, T = 7, z = T (panel d).
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Figure S 6: Same as the baseline case (Fig. 2a, main text), but only showing the frequency of the
Pc class (bars), together with three sets of strategies based on the response to punishment (x4).
The red line is the frequency of all strategies for which x4 = I, the blue line for which x4 = A, and
the green line for which x4 = L.
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Chapter two
Coevolution of positive reciprocity, punishment, partner
switching, and unconditional helping in a kin structured
population
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Abstract
Helping other individuals is often an investment: an act that reduces the helper’s current
payoff. Models trying to explain the evolution and maintenance of helping either investigate
how population structure may promote unconditional helping via kin selection and/or inter-
dependencies, or they investigate how partner control mechanisms like positive reciprocity,
punishment, or partner switching may yield conditional helping in repeated interactions in
panmictic populations. It is currently unclear how population structure would affect the var-
ious helping strategies, in particular if more complex conditional strategies incur a cognitive
cost compared to simpler strategies, such as always help or always defect. Here, we address
these questions using simulations. We first show that our approach reproduces key results
from previous research, making our extension directly comparable to existing literature. We
find that regular changes in group composition due to overlapping generations promotes the
competitiveness of partner switching. Punishment is most strongly negatively affected by a
cost for strategic complexity. Kin structure increases the range of conditions where conditional
helping strategies are favoured over defection, while the conditions where unconditional help-
ing is favoured are rather stringent. Overall, our study highlights how combining ecological
and game theoretical modelling may yield unexpected and interesting outcomes.
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Introduction
Nature is full of examples where an individual helps another, i.e., increases the direct fitness of the
recipient (Carlisle and Zahavi, 1986; Russell and Hatchwell, 2001; Bergmu¨ller et al., 2005). Helping
often takes the form of an investment, defined as an act that reduces the helper’s current payoff and
increases the recipient’s current payoff (Bshary and Bergmu¨ller, 2008). Mutual helping based on
investments is traditionally modelled with the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Rapoport and Chammah,
1965). In this game, two players can either help or defect, where the payoffs are such that mutual
helping yields higher payoffs than mutual defection. The dilemma arises because defecting yields
a higher payoff than helping in each single round, no matter how the partner behaves (Luce and
Raiffa, 1957). Thus, the basic conclusion is that mutual defection is an evolutionarily stable
strategy in the game, and the only one if the game consists of a single interaction.
Two rather separate approaches have been developed to explain the evolution and persistence
of helping despite the apparent superiority of defection. The first approach (termed “ecological
approach” by Bshary and Bergmu¨ller, 2008) assumes that a population consists of unconditional
helpers and unconditional defectors only, and then investigates in how far specific aspects of pop-
ulation structure may promote the persistence of helpers. Limited migration of offspring between
demes of interacting individuals causes relatedness to build up within demes. Although the ben-
efits of a helping act are then likely to be received by a related individual, these benefits may be
cancelled out due to the increased competition between the offspring (Taylor, 1992a). Taylor and
Irwin have shown that this balance is disrupted if generations overlap, favouring the evolution of
helping behaviours (Taylor and Irwin, 2000). Various other assumptions such as the timing of life
cycle events, migration, competition, and more have been identified that can change the selective
gradient for helping behaviours (Lehmann and Rousset, 2010). Here, helping is altruistic in the
Hamiltonean sense, i.e., it reduces the helper’s lifetime direct fitness but is under positive selection
due to indirect fitness benefits (Hamilton, 1964a,b). Alternatively, between-group competition may
cause strong interdependency between individuals and hence helping may yield direct fitness ben-
efits to both helper and recipient, which we term cooperation (Lehmann and Keller, 2006; Bshary
and Bergmu¨ller, 2008). The latter type of models is often called multi-level selection models and
emphasise selective forces on the group level. However, it should be noted that in real life, group
structuring is typically linked to genetic structuring, leading to a combination of direct and indirect
benefits of helping (Okasha, 2006; Lehmann and Keller, 2006).
The second approach to explain helping based on mutual investments, termed “game theoretical
approach” by Bshary & Bergmu¨ller (Bshary and Bergmu¨ller, 2008), emphasises the observation
that many social interactions in nature are repeated and hence offer the potential for cooperative
solutions based on conditional strategies (Kreps et al., 1982; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). Game
theoretic models typically assume a genetically panmictic population and a probabilistic function
concerning the likelihood that partners will interact again. Under such circumstances, helping can
only evolve and persist if it yields direct fitness benefits. Direct benefits are achieved if cooperators
can use conditional responses, called partner control mechanisms, to push the payoff of defectors
below the population average, resulting in defectors being selected against (Bshary and Bronstein,
2011). For example, positive reciprocity is a partner control mechanism where investments are
conditioned on the investments made by the partner, and the most well-known strategy using pos-
itive reciprocity is tit-for-tat (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). This strategy invariably starts with
helping, but in subsequent rounds it expresses the action its partner has taken in the previous
rounds, and thus a cooperative partner will be rewarded while a defecting partner will not (Ax-
elrod and Hamilton, 1981; Linster, 1992). Other partner control mechanisms may also result in
cooperators gaining more payoff than defectors. Through partner switching cooperators can avoid
prolonged interactions with defectors and instead assort with other cooperators, leaving defectors
end up interacting with each other. Although switching partner may initially be costly as it neces-
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sitates finding a new partner, this can be overcome if the individual finds a cooperator to interact
with for sufficiently long to negate these costs (Aktipis, 2004; McNamara et al., 2008). A third
important partner control mechanism is punishment, where the focal punishes the defecting part-
ner thus decreasing the partner’s payoff to such extent that the partner is better off cooperating
(Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995; Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010).
Both the effects of population structure and repeated interactions are frequently studied, but
the two approaches are rarely properly combined. Game theoretic models often assume that the
individuals are unrelated, or a fixed relatedness is assumed between interaction partners (e.g.,
Roberts, 2005), rather than letting a distribution of relatedness coefficients emerge as a function
of specific life cycles. Conversely, ecological models often investigate scenarios in which individuals
act unconditionally (Taylor, 1992a; Taylor and Irwin, 2000), excluding conditional strategies from
the strategy space. Several models have investigated a combination of the two approaches, showing
that the effects are not additive (Lehmann and Keller, 2006; Akc¸ay and Cleve, 2012; Van Cleve and
Akc¸ay, 2014). Here, we attempt further integration of the two approaches. Integration warrants
a simple terminology to avoid confusion about the relative importance of direct versus indirect
fitness benefits. In the remainder of the manuscript, we will invariably use the term “helping” as
the phenomenon we wish to explain, keeping in mind that helping can be either altruistic (yield-
ing indirect fitness benefits) or cooperative (yielding direct fitness benefits) or a combination of
both. Our starting point is our recent study on the relative competitiveness of positive reciprocity,
punishment and partner switching in genetically unstructured populations (Wubs et al., 2016,
chapter one). Using simulations, the main results of that study were that positive reciprocity may
be favoured under rather restrictive conditions, as small deme sizes or few rounds of interactions
favoured punishment while large deme sizes and many rounds of interactions favoured partner
switching as partner control mechanisms (see also Izquierdo et al., 2010). Unconditional helping
was never frequent in the simulations. Here we expand the previous study by introducing three
factors that may potentially influence the relative competitiveness of helping strategies in impor-
tant ways. The first two factors affect the genetic structure of the population and hence the scope
for interactions between relatives: limited migration of offspring between demes, and overlapping
generations due to selective survival of the parental generation. As a third factor, we introduced
a cost that correlates with the complexity of a strategy, i.e., the amount of information that needs
to be processed to make appropriate decisions. This assumption appears to be justified based on
both theoretical research allowing for the evolution of the size of artificial intelligence networks
(McNally et al., 2012) and empirical research involving selection on cognitive performance (Mery
and Kawecki, 2003, 2004; Kotrschal et al., 2013). Such research shows that strategic sophistica-
tion comes at a cost that is only under positive selection under conditions in which sophistication
yields overall net benefits. We analysed the effect of each variable first separately and then the
combination of all three.
We were interested in three main questions. First, we asked in how far limited migration,
overlapping generations, and complexity costs influence either alone or in combination the relative
competitiveness of our conditionally helpful strategies, i.e., positive reciprocity, punishment and
partner switching. In previous work we have characterized the conditions where each partner con-
trol mechanism is likely to be dominant in genetically unstructured populations (Wubs et al., 2016,
chapter one). It remains unclear, however, how interactions among related individuals, overlapping
generations, and complexity costs affect the relative competitiveness of each partner control mecha-
nism. Second, we asked whether unconditional helping is ever favoured over conditional strategies
and over defective strategies outside the single interaction case (in which conditional strategies
offer no advantage), and if so which of our three factors would be particularly important. The
coevolution of conditional and unconditional strategies is rarely studied, and it would thus be
relevant to investigate what conditions may favour one type of strategies over the other. Third,
we investigated how the level of helping in the population is affected by the interaction between
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conditional strategies and a kin structure. Recent work has demonstrated that the combination of
repeated interactions and a kin structured population will increase the range of conditions where
helping is favoured by selection compared to either repeated interactions or a kin structure in
isolation (Lehmann and Keller, 2006; Akc¸ay and Cleve, 2012; Van Cleve and Akc¸ay, 2014), and it
would thus be interesting to find how levels of helping in our model are affected by the interaction.
We present iconic results in the main paper and more systematic variation of parameter values in
the supporting material. It is important to keep in mind that several idiosyncratic key strategy
parameters may vary greatly between species and/or individuals of the same species. For example,
the cost of switching may vary in nature from “virtually absent” to “almost certain death”, the
cost of punishing may depend on a species’ weaponry and/or an individual’s relative strength,
and the benefits of punishing may depend on the target’s memory abilities. As each parameter
may vary independently of the others, it is impossible to explore the full parameter space of all
possible parameter state combinations. Thus, the main insights of our simulations are conclusions
about how limited migration, overlapping generations, and complexity costs may affect the relative
competiveness of competing strategies.
The model
Population
We consider a haploid population of constant size with a total number of N = n × d adult
individuals, distributed on d demes of equal size n. The population advances in discrete time steps.
Each time step t = 1, 2, ..., T is marked by the following events. First, individuals within a deme
interact socially with each other and accumulate payoffs. Next, each individual produces a large
number of offspring proportionally to the payoff gained in the current time step. Each individual
offspring either disperses with probability m or remains on its native deme with probability 1 −
m. Each dispersing offspring selects any deme other than its natal deme with equal probability
1/(d−1). After dispersal the next generation is formed as follows. Each of the N individuals of the
parental generation survives with probability s and remains on the deme. Adults that have died
are replaced by randomly selected offspring from within the deme (both native and immigrant)
until deme size equals n, while the remaining offspring die.
This model is an extension of our previous work (Wubs et al., 2016, chapter one), with two
changes in the life cycle: 1) limited migration of the offspring resulting in relatedness building
up within demes (instead of random mixing), 2) generational overlap through survival of adult
individuals over successive time steps such that individuals born at different time may coexist and
reproduce at the same time (instead of the whole population dying each step).
Social interactions
During the social interaction phase the individuals play an extensive-form game that is repeated for
NR rounds before reproduction occurs. A single round of the game consists of five sequential moves.
The first move is a so-called move by nature (a random move), followed by four moves played by
the individuals, where the individuals interact in pairs and choose their actions simultaneously as
follows.
Move 0: random pairing. Each unpaired individual is randomly paired “by nature” to another
unpaired individual. Individuals cannot choose their interaction partner.
Move 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each individual chooses whether to help (action H) or to defect
(action D). A helping individual pays a personal payoff cost Ch, while contributing a payoff benefit
Bh to its partner. Choosing to defect does not affect the payoff of either individual.
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Move 2: leaving. Each individual decides whether to leave its partner (action L) or to stay
(action S). One individual leaving is sufficient for the pairbond to break. Both individuals pay a
payoff cost Cl if the pairbond breaks and will not engage in the next two moves. Instead, they are
added to a pool of unpaired individuals that will be re-matched in move 0 in the following round.
Move 3: punishment. Each individual decides whether to punish its partner (action P) or not
(action N). A punishing individual pays a personal payoff cost Cp while reducing the payoff of the
partner by Dp. Individuals that are not punished will skip the fourth move.
Move 4: response to punishment. A punished individual can respond to the punishment in three
different ways. (1) The individual ignores the punishment (action I), meaning it will not change
any future action whilst playing with the current partner unless specified by its own strategy.
(2) The individual leaves the partner (action L as in move 2), breaking the pairbond and both
individuals paying a cost Cl. (3) The individual alters its behaviour in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(action A), meaning that if it played action C (resp. D) in move 1 of this round, it will switch to
playing action D (resp. C) in move 1 for the next z rounds. If a punished individual is punished
again, it will again change its action for z rounds, thus “overwriting” previous punishment. If the
pairbond breaks, this effect of punishment disappears.
Strategies
We assume that strategies are pure and the actions are chosen deterministically. The strategy of
an individual consists of a decision rule for each move, except move 0. For move 1 the rule specifies
the action to take if the partner defected in the previous round, if the partner has helped and an
initial action the first time it interacts with a new partner, yielding 8 (= 23) decision rules. For
move 2 and 3 the decision rule specifies whether to leave or stay (and punish or not) if the partner
defected and if the partner helped in move 1 of the current round, yielding four decision rules for
each move. For move 4 the response to punishment is conditioned on being punished in the current
round, yielding three decision rules (corresponding to each action that can be taken in move 4).
To compose the strategy space we allow for any combination of decision rules for the separate
moves. This generates a set of 384 (= 8× 4× 4× 3) strategies from which remove phenotypically
indistinguishable strategies, i.e., strategies that cannot be distinguished by observing the actions
only. The final set of strategies then contains 92 unique strategies, which are listed in the online
supplementary material. See (Wubs et al., 2016, chapter one) or the online supplementary material
for further details regarding the strategy space.
For the analysis of the results we pool the strategies into six distinct classes. Each strategy
of the positive reciprocity class (denoted Rc; we use the subscript c to indicate that it concerns a
class of strategies) helps the first time it interacts with a new partner, while in subsequent rounds
it copies the action of the partner, and it does not leave or punish the partner. Each strategy
of the partner switching class (denoted Sc) will always help in move 1, it does not punish, but
it leaves as soon as the partner defects. Each strategy of the punishment class (denoted Pc) will
always help in move 1, it does not leave, but it punishes a partner that defects. Each strategy of
the unconditional helping (denoted Cc)and unconditional defecting class (denoted Dc) always helps
(defects if Dc), and does not express any conditional play in move 1, 2, and 3. Each of these classes
of strategies consists of three strategies that differ only in how they respond to being punished.
The remaining 92− 5× 3 = 77 strategies are pooled in “rest”.
Strategic complexity
Each round individuals suffer a reduction in payoff correlated to the complexity of the strategy
used. We use a naive measure to compute the cost of a given strategy based on the assumption that
conditional strategies are more costly than unconditional ones. The cost per strategy is determined
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as follows. We define a total strategic complexity score as the sum of the complexity scores of its
decision rules for each move. The complexity score of the decision rules is determined as follows.
For each move, the actions taken are either conditional on what the partner did, or fixed. Any
conditional decision rule gets a complexity score of 1, an unconditional/fixed rule receives a score
of 0. The sum of scores determines how complex a strategy is. Thus as an example, the strategy
always help in move 1 (fixed behaviour), leave defectors only in move 2 (conditional), never punish
in move 3 (fixed), and alter behaviour after receiving punishment (conditional) has a complexity
score of 2 (0 + 1 + 0 + 1). The total strategic complexity score is multiplied by a complexity scalar
Cs ≥ 0 to compute the payoff cost an individual pays each round. Therefore, Cs determines the
weight of the total strategic complexity score in relation to the other parameters of the model, and
thus if Cs = 0 the individual does not pay any cost, regardless of the complexity of its strategy.
Analyses
The model is analysed using individual-based simulation where we track the frequencies of the
six classes of strategies in the population. The number of offspring an individual produces per
time step is proportional to a baseline payoff (guaranteeing there can be no negative payoff) plus
the effects of the social interaction during that time step and the effect of the complexity of its
strategy. Offspring adopt with probability 1−µ the strategy of the parent, but with probability µ
the offspring mutates to any other strategy with equal probability.
We define one generation as the number of time steps it takes on average for the entire pop-
ulation to be replaced. Thus if the survival rate (s) is 0.95, then one generation is equal to
1/(1 − 0.95) = 20 time steps. We ran simulations for 106 generations and computed the average
frequency of each class of strategies over an entire run, where each strategy was equally abundant
in the population at the first generation. Finally, we computed the frequency of helping in a simu-
lation, which is defined as the average frequency over the entire population and the repeated game
where the individual helped its partner in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (move 1).
We note here that throughout the results we maintain the expected number of rounds (= NR1−s )
the individuals play at 30. In our previous work we found that the number of rounds can have a
profound impact on the outcome. Focusing on 30 rounds is suitable for our current analyses because
the three partner control mechanisms of interest coexisted to varying degrees in our previous
analyses, depending on the deme size (Wubs et al., 2016, chapter one). We can hence investigate
how adding migration, survival, and complexity costs affect the relative competitiveness of these
control mechanisms, and how far the unconditional helping strategy may replace conditional ones.
Results
The results are structured as follows. We start by recovering two known results. 1) We reproduce
similar results to our previous work, thus excluding the three new factors that are introduced in
the current model: overlapping generations, limited migration between demes, and a complexity
cost for strategies. This will be our baseline case. 2) We also recover analytical predictions made
by Taylor and Irwin, who have shown when unconditional helpers are favoured over defectors in
a kin structured population (Taylor and Irwin, 2000). We then proceed by introducing each new
factor separately to our baseline model before we include all factors in a single model. For each
analysis we delineate the conditions where each helping class of strategies (Cc, Rc, Pc, and Sc) is
favoured by selection. We do this for both a low benefit to cost ratio (2 to 1) and a high one (10
to 1) to ensure that our model fits in the Taylor and Irwin framework. For the high benefit to cost
ratio case we present results with all factors included in a single model here, while referring to the
supplementary material for the results where each factor is introduced in isolation, as these were
found to be mostly similar to the low benefit to cost ratio case. Finally, we investigate how the
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level of helping is affected due to the interaction of a kin structured population and conditional
strategies.
Recovering baseline results
The panmictic case
In figure 1 we have reproduced one of our main previous findings (Fig. 3b in Wubs et al., 2016,
chapter one), which shows the Pc class as the dominant class of helping strategies for deme size up to
40 for the following parameters: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, µ = 0.01, d = 250, z = 5.
Furthermore, to match the previous model, NR = 30 and s = 0 (thus generations do not overlap),
the migration rate is set to 0.996 (= 1 − 1/d) such that there is random mixing of the offspring
generation (no genetic structure), and Cs = 0 such that there is no cost of complexity for the
strategies. Note hat for n = 2 (which was not tested in Wubs et al., 2016, chapter one) the
rest class dominates instead, which consists mostly of strategies that initiate the interaction with
defection, punish other defectors, but switch to helping when being punished. From this baseline
case we introduce the various new factors in the section “New results”.
The structured case
We now reproduce the analytical predictions made by Taylor and Irwin showing when helpers are
favoured over defectors in pairwise interactions in an infinite island model (equations A9 and A10
Taylor and Irwin, 2000; note that there is no cost for dispersal in our model). With m = 0.2, s =
0.96667, Bh = 10, Ch = 1, helpers are favoured by selection for n ≤ 6 (we use s = 0.96667 to
set the expected number of interactions to 30 in order to match the conditions from our previous
work). In figure 2 our results are plotted using those parameter values together with only one
always help and one always defect strategy in the model. We find that the helpers are relatively
favoured over defectors up until deme size 6, thus verifying that our model fits within the Taylor
and Irwin framework.
New results
Migration
Here we introduce a limited migration rate to our baseline case in figure 1. In figure 3 we show the
results of simulations with the same parameter values as in figure 1, except for m = 0.5 in panel
a and m = 0.2 in panel b. We find that a limited rate of migration for the offspring has little
effect on the relative proportion of the different classes of strategies, which is in line with various
findings that the benefit of interacting with related individuals may often be cancelled out by the
increased competition among relatives (Taylor, 1992a).
Overlapping generations
Introducing overlapping generations to our baseline model negatively impacts the frequency of
the Pc class. In figure 4a we set NR = 10, s = 0.66667 (thus keeping the expected number of
rounds an individual plays at 30) with otherwise identical parameter values as in figure 1, while
in panel b we set NR = 1, s = 0.96667. We find that especially the Sc class is relatively more
favoured by selection when generations strongly overlap, as the Sc class dominates for n ≥ 10
(Fig. 4b). The Sc class is relatively more favoured here because of the increased variation in the
deme composition due to the overlap in generations: when generations do not overlap a partner
switcher in a deme full of defectors will switch each round of the game, but end up interacting with
a defector each time. If generations overlap, then at each time step there is a non-zero probability
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of new individuals arriving in the deme (from any deme, including the focal one). Due to the
extra variation introduced the Sc class is more likely to get paired with another helping strategy
eventually and is thus favoured by selection over the Pc class.
Strategic complexity
We now introduce a cost for strategic complexity to our baseline case (Fig. 1). In figure 5a the
results are shown for Cs = 0.1 with otherwise identical parameter values as in figure 1. We find
that the Pc class has almost entirely disappeared from the population, being replaced by the Dc
class in small demes (n ≤ 10), the Rc class in intermediate sized demes (12 ≤ n ≤ 32), and Sc
class in large demes (n ≥ 34). This strong reduction in frequency for the Pc class is due to the fact
that the recipient switching to helping after being punished will have a reduction in payoff (as it
pays the cost for conditionally responding to punishment). Thus, defectors that opportunistically
switch to help punisher are more strongly selected against if Cs increases and as a consequence the
competitiveness of the Pc class decreases, while the Sc and Rc classes do not necessarily require
their partner to use conditional strategies. For Cs = 0.2 (panel b) we find that the Dc class is
favoured for a larger range of deme sizes (n ≤ 26) as the strategies in this class are less costly than
conditional strategies. Therefore for higher values of Cs the Dc class is more likely to be favoured
by selection, since in the absence of relatedness the Cc class will similarly be selected against.
Full model - low benefit/cost ratio
We now present the results of the full model, thus combining a limited migration rate, a cost for
strategic complexity, and overlapping generations. We use the following parameter values: Bh =
2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, NR = 1, µ = 0.01, d = 250, z = 5, s = 0.96667,m = 0.5, Cs = 0.1.
We find that through the combination of limited migration, overlapping generations and a cost
for strategic complexity the Pc class is very much selected against compared to our baseline case
(Fig. 6a). The Sc class dominates for n ≥ 12, which is a considerably smaller deme size compared
to our previous model (n ≥ 76, Fig. 3b in Wubs et al., 2016, chapter one). However, in smaller
demes the Sc class is still outcompeted by the Rc class (4 ≤ n ≤ 12), which shows that in small
demes a switching strategy is unlikely to dominate. Finally, only for n = 2 the Dc and rest class are
instead dominant in the population, where also the main strategy in the rest class always defects
in move 1, and thus the level of helping in the population here is low.
A higher cost of complexity (Cs = 0.2, panel b) results in the Dc dominating for n ≤ 20 and
the Sc for larger deme sizes, while if the cost of switching is increased as well (Cs = 0.2, Cl = 5,
panel c) the Dc class is dominant for any deme size. This shows that as the costs for conditional
strategies increases, the unconditional Dc class will end up dominating since it is also favoured
over the Cc class for this benefit to cost ratio (Taylor and Irwin, 2000).
We also find, however, that other classes than the Cc class may benefit from interacting with
more closely related individuals. In panel d the migration rate is reduced to 0.2 while otherwise
using the same parameter values as in panel c. As a result, the Rc class now dominates for n ≤ 8.
This together shows that depending on the exact combination of parameter values, various classes
of strategies may dominate.
Full model - high benefit/cost ratio
In order to identify conditions where the Cc class is favoured over conditional helping classes, we
performed simulations with a high benefit from a helping act (Bh), which is needed for uncon-
ditional helpers to outcompete unconditional defectors (Taylor and Irwin, 2000). For the high
benefit to cost ratio case we first show that, also when including all 92 strategies in the model,
we can still recover the analytical predictions by Taylor and Irwin, and then note a few subtle
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differences between the low and high benefit to cost ratio case. In figure 7a the results of the
following parameter values are shown: Bh = 10, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 10, Cl = 10, NR = 1, µ =
0.01, d = 250, z = 5, s = 0.96667,m = 0.2, Cs = 10, thus with a high benefit for helping, but
large costs for strategic complexity, punishing, and switching partners, together leading to strong
selection against any strategy other than the simplest always help and always defect strategy. As
such, we find that the Cc class (which contains the simplest strategy that always helps) dominates
for n ≤ 6 and the Dc class (which contains the simplest strategy that always defects) beyond that
point, which shows that the model is consistent with the results of Taylor and Irwin (Fig. 2).
Then, in order to compare the high and low benefit to cost ratio cases, in panels b and c (of
Fig. 7) the parameter values are as in figure 6a and b, respectively, except for Bh = 10. This
shows, first of all, that a higher benefit from a helpful act results in more helping in the population
as the Dc class is virtually absent (Fig. 7c) while it dominated for n ≤ 20 for Bh = 2 (Fig. 6b).
Furthermore we now find that for Cs = 0.2 the Cc class increases in frequency. However, the Cc
class is also here never found to be the dominant class of helping strategies, and thus a high benefit
to cost ratio does not result in unconditional helping being relatively favoured over conditional
strategies. Therefore, the conditions where unconditional helping is favoured over conditional
helping appear to be rather stringent (e.g., with unlikely high Cs).
Helping
We now turn to the level of helping itself. We analyse the level of helping in three main cases: in a
kin structured population with only the always help and always defect strategies, in a genetically
unstructured population with the full strategy set, and in a kin structured population with the full
strategy set. For a migration rate of 0.996 (= 1− 1/d) the population is genetically unstructured,
and we thus expect and find that in the absence of conditional strategies the population almost
entirely exists of defectors (Fig. 8, m = 0.996, grey bars). Reducing the migration rate results
in relatedness within demes building up, and we consequently find higher levels of helping, where
especially for n = 2 (where relatedness is relatively high) high levels of helping are achieved.
Futhermore, we find that if individuals use conditional strategies, helping can evolve in a genetically
unstructured population (Fig. 8, m = 0.996, orange bars). However, the highest levels of helping are
achieved through a combination of conditional strategies and a kin structured population (orange
bars, m = 0.5 and m = 0.2), which is in line with predictions from previous work (Lehmann and
Keller, 2006; Akc¸ay and Cleve, 2012; Van Cleve and Akc¸ay, 2014).
Interestingly, we do not necessarily find that higher levels of relatedness (as achieved through
a reduction in migration rate) increases the overall level of helping. Obviously the level of helping
cannot increase much further, but the slight decrease in the level of helping was found for a variety
of parameter combinations. On closer inspection, we find that the Rc class is relatively more
favoured than the Pc class when the migration rate is decreased. Thus, while the Pc class always
helps their partner, the Rc class switches to play defect when faced with a defecting partner.
Cooperation between strategies from the Rc class and other strategies is thus slightly less likely to
occur, and as such the level of helping slightly decreases when the Rc class replaces the Pc class.
Testing the robustness of results
In the supplementary material we provide additional simulations that test the robustness of the
various results presented here. First, we show that a high benefit to cost ratio does not affect
the relative competitiveness of helping strategies, though levels of helping are increased (Figs. S1
to S4). Furthermore, we show that fewer numbers of interactions (by varying survival) do not favour
unconditional helping (Fig. S5). Finally, we show that even if the effect of being punished (z) lasts
indefinitely, the Pc class is still largely outcompeted by other strategies for Cs = 0.1, Bh = 2
(Fig. S6).
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Discussion
Our model and results build upon previous work where we have investigated the coevolution of
three partner control mechanisms (positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching) in a
genetically unstructured population. In the current work we added three new factors: 1) limited
migration of the offspring individuals; 2) overlapping generations; 3) cost for strategic complexity.
The first two will ensure that relatedness within a deme will build up, while the latter acknowledges
that unconditional strategies are cognitively less demanding than conditional ones. We will first
discuss the effect of each factor on the relative competitiveness of the different partner control
mechanism, followed by a section on unconditional helping versus conditional helping, and finally
discuss the effects of relatedness and conditionality on the level of helping.
Partner control mechanisms
With a migration rate below 1−(1/d) relatedness will build up within demes. However, our life cycle
assumptions are such that individuals first interact socially, followed by reproduction, mortality of
the parental generation (complete mortality in our baseline case), and then migration. Therefore,
with non-overlapping generations (Fig. 3) the benefits of interacting with related individuals are
exactly cancelled out by the increased competition for resources (i.e., the breeding spots on a deme)
among relatives (Taylor, 1992a,b; West, 2002). In line with this logic, levels of helping and the
relative competitiveness of our strategies were hardly affected by migration rates alone (Fig. 3).
In principle, it could have been possible that the changes in migration rate may affect relative
competitiveness of strategies by changing variation in deme composition: if offspring randomly mix
over demes then the composition of a deme will reflect the composition of the entire population,
while if migration is limited then on average the majority of individuals will be sampled from the
focal deme resulting in less variation within demes. Such reduced variation within a deme should
reduce the likelihood that a switching individual finds another helping partner and hence reduce
the strategy’s relative competitiveness. Apparently, this effect was not strong enough to alter the
outcome in our baseline case.
The main effect of having generations overlap in our model is that it increases the competi-
tiveness of the switching strategy (Fig. 4). Variation is a key factor for the evolution of helping
(McNamara et al., 2004; McNamara and Leimar, 2010), and our results highlight that the prob-
ability of finding a helping partner can depend on generational overlap rather than on standing
variation in a population, as typically assumed. The extent to which generations overlap influences
the number of potential partners a focal individual can have during its lifetime: while it is fixed at
n−1 when there is no overlap, the number will be higher for overlapping generations. For example,
for demes with n = 40, s = 0.96667, on average 1.33 individuals die each time step in a deme, and
thus a focal individual living for 30 time steps will share the deme with 78 (= n − 1 + 29 ∗ 1.33)
individuals during its lifetime. More importantly, any death will lead to two new potential part-
ners available for pairing up for the next round: the “widow” and the replacement. Due to the
higher number of potential partners a switching strategy benefits greatly from generational overlap
(Fig. 4).
In the economic literature the fact that more complex strategies may be more costly and that
this will influence the outcome of a model has long been recognised (Piccione and Rubinstein,
1993; Abreu and Rubinstein, 1988; Binmore and Samuelson, 1992), but in biological models it is
often neglected. Here we have applied a complexity cost by penalizing conditionality, which was
found to increase the relative competitiveness of the Rc and Sc classes compared to the Pc class
as the Pc class relies on a conditional response in its partner (Fig. 5). Rather similarly, in our
previous model we found that positive reciprocity was often outcompeted by alternative partner
control mechanisms due to the absence of defectors that opportunistically switch to helping when
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paired with a positive reciprocity player (Wubs et al., 2016, chapter one). Thus the evolutionary
success of both positive reciprocity and punishment (also called negative reciprocity) rely on the
presence of “smart” defectors.
This result exposes an important issue with punishment in general. That is, the recipient of
a punishing act has to learn to associate the punishment as a result of its own behaviour, and,
additionally, alter its behaviour accordingly. It may be (relatively) easy for a focal individual to
associate receiving punishment each time it performs a specific action (say, stealing food) and
thus learn to stop performing that action. However, if the focal is punished for defecting (which
technically is an action in our model, but in nature would mean doing nothing), the punished
individual is less likely to learn to express the “right” behaviour (Raihani et al., 2012). As such,
the evolution of punishment as a partner control mechanism to stabilize cooperation may be
strongly impaired due to cognitive constraints, which in turn may exist due to the costs of cognitive
strategies. Our model verifies that, due to this extra hurdle that needs to be taken for punishment
to be effective, the likelihood of punishment evolving as the dominant partner control mechanism
is severely decreased.
Unconditional helping
In the full model, due to combining a limited migration rate with overlapping generations, uncon-
ditional helping can be favoured by selection over defection. Although unconditional helpers are
often part of the strategy set in models testing partner control mechanisms (Garc´ıa and Traulsen,
2012; Izquierdo et al., 2010), rarely is it investigated when they would outcompete conditional
strategies. This can occur when conditional strategies are being penalised for their conditionality
and the relatedness within demes is high enough to favour the Cc class over the Dc class. This is
exemplified in figure 7a, where the parameters are set to select against any other strategy than
the most simple always help and always defect strategy and thus we recover the analytical result
from Taylor and Irwin here (Taylor and Irwin, 2000). However, we would argue that such extreme
conditions are extremely rare in natural populations. Without extreme costs we find for both a
low and a high benefit to cost ratio conditional helping strategies are relatively favoured over un-
conditional ones (Figs. 6 and 7). One could argue that other mechanisms, such as kin recognition,
may still allow helping to be stable against defection without the need for partner control mecha-
nisms (Antal et al., 2009). However, recognizing kin may be cognitively costly as well or could be
combined with a partner control mechanism, and thus further modelling is required to determine
how such a mechanism will affect the competitiveness of unconditional helping. Additionally, in
species where a kin recognition mechanism has been identified, the kin are not necessarily treated
preferentially (Mateo, 2002). Finally, one may expect that unconditional helping could gain a
relative advantage over conditional helping when the number of rounds of interaction during a
lifetime is reduced, since conditional strategies depend on multiple rounds of interaction. However,
in the online supplementary material we show that when varying the survival, such that individual
go from 1 to 10 number of rounds of interaction, the conditional strategies are still favoured over
unconditional helping (Fig. S5).
Helping
Theoretical research on social evolution can be roughly divided into two main approaches. First,
the evolution of altruistic traits due to assortment of genetically related individuals, and second,
the evolution and maintenance of helping due to the evolution of conditional strategies. In their
seminal paper, Axelrod and Hamilton already realised that clustering of individuals would increase
the range of conditions under which the tit for tat strategy can invade the always defect strategy
(Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). Despite this recognition, much of the literature focuses on a
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single approach. Although this may ease the analysis, it is now increasingly being recognized
that for a proper understanding of the evolution of a social trait the two approaches need to
be combined. In several recent papers the fitness effects of interacting with both behaviourally
responsive unrelated individuals (e.g., conditional strategies) and genetically related individuals
are combined into a single equation (Lehmann and Keller, 2006; Akc¸ay and Cleve, 2012; Van Cleve
and Akc¸ay, 2014). From these equations it is clear that the effects of relatedness and responsiveness
cannot be subsumed into a single parameter, and thus both must be considered when studying the
evolution of a social trait (Akc¸ay and Cleve, 2012; Van Cleve and Akc¸ay, 2014).
We have tested several analytical predictions in our model. First, we tested whether our model
can reproduce the predictions made by Taylor and Irwin regarding the evolution of helping in
a kin structured population (Taylor and Irwin, 2000). There are two differences between their
analytical model and our simulations: we use a fixed number of demes and allow mutants to enter
the population at every time step. Despite this, we find that helping evolves under the same
conditions as predicted by their equations (Fig. 2).
Second, we also show here that when conditional strategies evolve in a kin structured popula-
tion, the level of helping can be significantly higher compared to unconditional strategies in a kin
structured population or conditional strategies in an unstructured population (Fig. 8). However,
our results highlight the fact that the presence of conditional (behaviourally responsive) strategies
may affect the level of helping in counter intuitive ways. Increasing relatedness, which increases
the level of helping in the absence of conditional strategies, can decrease the level of helping under
certain conditions (Fig. 8). This is due to helping strategies differing in the likelihood that they
induce a partner into helping. Although the level of helping is only marginally affected, one should
be aware that the interaction between relatedness and behavioural responsive strategies may yield
unexpected outcomes.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have made an attempt here to combine an ecological modelling approach with
a game-theoretic one. By letting conditional strategies evolve in a kin structured population we
studied the interaction of the two. Although strategies may evolve in our model both because of
indirect effects (helping related individuals) or direct effects (using a partner control mechanism),
we cannot easily partition direct and indirect effects on the fitness of an individual in the model.
We were, however, able to study the isolated effect of several factors (migration rate, survival rate,
complexity cost; Figs. 3, 4, and 5). Furthermore, while unconditional helping is unlikely to be
favoured by selection over conditional helping strategies (Figs. 6 and 7), we showed that a kin-
structure increased the range of conditions where conditional strategies are favoured over defection
(Fig. 6c, d and supplementary material).
One of the most striking results is that both positive reciprocity and partner switching are
much more likely to dominate in the population compared to our previous work where punishment
was found to be the dominant partner control mechanism for a large part of the parameter space
(Wubs et al., 2016, chapter one). However, we argue that the three factors introduced here add
more realism to the model, as they apply to many species where also direct benefits are documented,
such as many primate species (Schino and Aureli, 2010). It is therefore not surprising that most
work on primates document either positive reciprocity or partner choice as the mechanism by
which helping is stabilized (Schino and Aureli, 2016), the same mechanisms that are found to be
dominant in our model. The current model therefore better represents what is seen in nature.
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Table and figures
Table 1: Meaning of used symbols.
Symbol Meaning
N Population size
n Deme size
d Number of demes
T Time steps
m Migration rate
s Survival rate
NR Number of rounds
Ch Payoff cost when helping
Bh Payoff benefit for the recipient of a helping act
Cl Payoff cost when the pairbond breaks
Cp Cost of punishing
Dp Payoff reduction when being punished
z Duration of behavioural change after being punished
Cs Scalar for cost of strategic complexity
µ Mutation rate
Cc Unconditionally helping class
Rc Positive reciprocity class
Pc Punishment class
Sc Switching class
Dc Unconditionally defect class
“rest” Remaining strategies
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Figure 1: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of helping (black line)
and the six classes of strategies (Cc,Rc,Sc,Pc,Dc, and rest) plotted a function of deme size n.
Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, NR = 30, z = 5, µ = 0.01, d = 250,m =
0.996, s = 0, Cs = 0.
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Figure 2: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperators and
defectors plotted a function of deme size n. Parameter values: Bh = 10, Ch = 1, µ = 0.001, d =
250,m = 0.2, s = 0.96667. Irrelevant parameters: Dp, Cp, Cl, NR, z, Cs.
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Figure 3: Same as in figure 1, except the migration rate m = 0.5 in panel a and m = 0.2 in panel
b.
51
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
8 16 24 32 40
a
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
8 16 24 32 40
C c
Rc
Sc
Pc
Dc
rest
b
Deme size (n)
T
im
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
o
f 
ea
ch
 c
la
ss
 o
f
st
ra
te
g
ie
s 
an
d
 h
el
p
in
g
Figure 4: Same as in figure 1, except the number of rounds NR = 10 and the survival rate
s = 0.66667 in panel a and NR = 1, s = 0.96667 in panel b.
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Figure 5: Same as in figure 1, except complexity scalar Cs = 0.1 in panel a and Cs = 0.2 in panel
b.
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Figure 6: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of helping (black line)
and the six classes of strategies (Cc,Rc,Sc,Pc,Dc, and rest) plotted a function of deme size n.
Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, NR = 1, z = 5, µ = 0.01, d = 250, s = 0.96667.
Panel specific parameters: panel a Cs = 0.1,m = 0.5, Cl = 1; panel b Cs = 0.2,m = 0.5, Cl = 1;
panel c Cs = 0.2,m = 0.5, Cl = 5; panel d Cs = 0.2,m = 0.2, Cl = 5.
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Figure 7: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of helping (black line)
and the six classes of strategies (Cc,Rc,Sc,Pc,Dc, and rest) plotted a function of deme size n.
Parameter values: Bh = 10, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, NR = 1, z = 5, µ = 0.01, d = 250, s = 0.96667. Panel
specific parameters: panel a m = 0.2, Cs = 10, Cl = 10, Cp = 10; panel b m = 0.5, Cs = 0.1, Cl =
1, Cp = 1; panel c m = 0.5, Cs = 0.2, Cl = 1, Cp = 1.
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Figure 8: Level of helping for different migration rates. Parameter values: Bh = 10, Ch = 1, Dp =
2, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, NR = 1, z = 5, µ = 0.01, d = 250, s = 0.96667, Cs = 0. Grey columns show
results for simulations using only one always help and one always defect strategy, orange columns
include the full strategy set.
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Supplementary material
Introducing migration rate, overlapping generations, and complexity costs
with a high benefit to cost ratio
We start by showing how each factor (migration rate, overlapping generations, complexity cost)
affects the results when introduced in the high benefit to cost ratio case. For this, we first show
the distribution of classes of strategies in our baseline case with a high benefit, Bh = 10. The
results are plotted in figure 1. From these results it is clear that changing the benefit of a helping
act (Bh) has little impact on the frequency of the various classes of strategies, since the Pc class is
also here the dominant helping class of strategies for any deme size.
Migration rate
Introducing a limited migration rate to our baseline case with Bh = 10 (figure 1) distorts the
frequencies of the various classes more than compared to the baseline with Bh = 2 as in the
manuscript. The results, plotted in figure 2, show that a limited migration rate increases the
frequency of the Rc class for small deme sizes. However, it should be noted that only for n = 8
the Rc class is actually dominant, while for all other deme sizes the Pc class is.
Overlapping generations
When introducing generational overlap to the baseline case we find again that the Sc class is more
strongly favoured by selection (figure 3). Compared to the results shown in the manuscript we do
not find the Rc class with intermediate generational overlap (for NR = 10, s = 0.66667) since the
Sc class will benefit more from a higher Bh as soon as a helping partner has been found.
Complexity cost
Regarding the cost of complexity we find that the transition from the Pc class to the other helping
classes to the Dc class occurs for higher values of Cs (figure 4). With Cs = 0.2 the Sc and Cc classes
dominate for large n, while the Pc class is still dominant up to n = 34. Undoubtedly the Dc class
will eventually end up dominating with large enough Cs since the Cc class will be outcompeted in
a genetically unstructured population.
Fewer interactions
In this section we test whether fewer number of interactions favours unconditional helping over
conditional helping as conditional strategies are obviously dependent on repeated interactions, and
higher number of interactions may relatively increase the payoff gained by conditional strategies.
To test this we vary the survival from 0 to 0.9 in figure 5. With s = 0 individuals interact only
once before reproducing and dying. As such the population consists of various strategies that
defect on the first interaction, since subsequent interaction are irrelevant. If survival is increased
to s = 0.3 the Dc class replaces other defecting strategies: e.g. strategies that would defect on
the first interaction, but then start to help unconditionally. We see here that for n = 2 a small
proportion of the population consists of the Rc class already, which has a much larger frequency
than the Cc class. Increasing survival even further, to s = 0.6 and s = 0.9, will recover almost
similar results as are found in the main text (figure 7b; although Cs = 0.1 there). As such, for
Cs = 0 we are unable to find conditions where the Cc class outcompetes other helping classes of
strategies.
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Additional parameter variation for full model
Here we show results of various conditions where the Pc class may be relatively more favoured
compared to what is found in the main text. In the first panel in figure 6 we set Cs = 0.1 but
with a high cost of switching (Cl = 5) and the behavioural change after receiving punishment lasts
indefinitely (z = 0), where both changes should relatively favour the Pc class. However, even under
such favourable conditions we find that for small demes the Pc class is largely outcompeted by the
Rc class, while in larger dems it is outcompeted by the Sc class. As such, with Cs = 0.1 the Pc
class is very unlikely to dominate.
Setting Cs = 0 while keeping Cl = 5, z = 0, we do find that the Pc class is dominant for any
deme size (up until at least 40), which again verifies how strongly the class is affected by the
parameter Cs. In the third and fourth panel we set z = 5 and Cl = 1, respectively. This shows
that in the absence of a cognitive cost we can find various conditions where the Pc class will still
outcompete alternative conditional helping strategies.
Strategy set
In table S1 the decision rules for each move of the stage game are listed, while table S2 lists the
main classes of strategies. In table S3 the full set of strategies is given. The coding of the decision
rules is as follows.
We assume that the strategy for move 1 specifies an action taken when the individual first
interacts with its partner, and an action taken in subsequent rounds is conditioned on what the
partner did in the previous round in move 1. This decision rule can thus be written as a1aCaD,
where a1, aC, aD ∈ {C,D}. Here, a1 is the action taken the first time the two individuals in a pair
interact, aC is the action taken if the partner cooperated in the previous round, and aD is the
action taken if the partner defected in the previous round. We thus have a total of 8 (23) decision
rules for move 1: {CCC, CCD, CDC, CDD, DCC, DCD, DDC, DDD}.
For move 2, the decision to leave or stay is assumed to be conditional on the action taken by
the partner in move 1 of the current round. Hence, the decision rule can be written as aCaD, where
aC ∈ {L,S} (aD ∈ {L,S}) gives the action take when the partner cooperated (defected). The set
of decision rules for move 2 is thus {LL, LS, SL, SS}.
Likewise, for move 3, the decision to punish or not to punish the partner is assumed to be
conditional on the action taken by the partner in move 1, so that the decision rule is aCaD, where
aC ∈ {P,N} (aD ∈ {P,N}) is the action taken when the partner cooperated (defected). The set of
decision rules for move 3 is thus {PP, PN, NP, NN}.
Finally, the response to punishment in move 4 is simply given by {I,A,L}.
An X in a decision rule in table S3 is a placeholder for an action that is not played at any
point during the game (C or D in move 1; P or N in move 3). Two strategies that are otherwise
similar, but differing in this action would therefore never act differently (i.e. they are phenotypically
indistinguishable). Only one of these two strategies is included in the strategy space. This can
occur in two situations. First, if an individual leaves after the partner cooperates (or defects),
then it cannot also punish or conditionally cooperate/defect in the following round since the pair
is broken up, and thus an X is shown in place of the action in both the decision rule for move 1
and 3. Second, we assumed that a punishing act could not be followed by a conditional action
in move 1 of the following round, and thus the action P in the decision rule for move 3 is always
combined with an X in the decision rule for move 1.
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Table S 1: The sets of decision rules for each move of the game.
Move 1: {CCC,CCD,CDC,CDD,DCC,DCD,DDC,DDD}
Move 2: {LL,SS,LS,SL}
Move 3: {PP,NN,PN,NP}
Move 4: {I,A,L}
Table S 2: Main classes of strategies.
Name Move 1 Move 2 Move 3 Move 4
Always cooperate Cc CCC SS NN {I,A,L}
Positive reciprocity Rc CCD SS NN {I,A,L}
Partner switching Sc CCC SL NN {I,A,L}
Punishment Pc CCC SS NP {I,A,L}
Always defect Dc DDD SS NN {I,A,L}
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Table S 3: Full set of strategies used in all simulations.
Move 1 Move 2 Move 3 Move 4 Complexity Move 1 Move 2 Move 3 Move 4 Complexity
CCC SS NN I 0 DCC SS NN I 1
CCC SS NN A 1 DCC SS NN A 2
CCC SS NN L 1 DCC SS NN L 2
CCD SS NN I 1 DCD SS NN I 1
CCD SS NN A 2 DCD SS NN A 2
CCD SS NN L 2 DCD SS NN L 2
CCX SL NX I 1 DCX SL NX I 2
CCX SL NX A 2 DCX SL NX A 3
CCX SL NX L 2 DCX SL NX L 3
CCX SS NP I 1 DCX SS NP I 2
CCX SS NP A 2 DCX SS NP A 3
CCX SS NP L 2 DCX SS NP L 3
CDC SS NN I 1 DDC SS NN I 1
CDC SS NN A 2 DDC SS NN A 2
CDC SS NN L 2 DDC SS NN L 2
CDD SS NN I 1 DDD SS NN I 0
CDD SS NN A 2 DDD SS NN A 1
CDD SS NN L 2 DDD SS NN L 1
CDX SL NX I 2 DDX SL NX I 1
CDX SL NX A 3 DDX SL NX A 2
CDX SL NX L 3 DDX SL NX L 2
CDX SS NP I 2 DDX SS NP I 1
CDX SS NP A 3 DDX SS NP A 2
CDX SS NP L 3 DDX SS NP L 2
CXC LS XN I 1 DXC LS XN I 2
CXC LS XN A 2 DXC LS XN A 3
CXC LS XN L 2 DXC LS XN L 3
CXD LS XN I 2 DXD LS XN I 1
CXD LS XN A 3 DXD LS XN A 2
CXD LS XN L 3 DXD LS XN L 2
CXX LL XX I 0 DXX LL XX I 0
CXX LS XP I 2 DXX LS XP I 2
CXX LS XP A 3 DXX LS XP A 3
CXX LS XP L 3 DXX LS XP L 3
CXC SS PN I 1 DXC SS PN I 2
CXC SS PN A 2 DXC SS PN A 3
CXC SS PN L 2 DXC SS PN L 3
CXD SS PN I 2 DXD SS PN I 1
CXD SS PN A 3 DXD SS PN A 2
CXD SS PN L 3 DXD SS PN L 2
CXX SL PX I 2 DXX SL PX I 2
CXX SL PX A 3 DXX SL PX A 3
CXX SL PX L 3 DXX SL PX L 3
CXX SS PP I 0 DXX SS PP I 0
CXX SS PP A 1 DXX SS PP A 1
CXX SS PP L 1 DXX SS PP L 1
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Figure S 1: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of helping (black line)
and the six classes of strategies (Cc,Rc,Sc,Pc,Dc, and rest) plotted a function of deme size n.
Parameter values: Bh = 10, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, NR = 30, z = 5, µ = 0.01, d =
250,m = 0.996, s = 0, Cs = 0.
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Figure S 2: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of helping (black line)
and the six classes of strategies (Cc,Rc,Sc,Pc,Dc, and rest) plotted a function of deme size n.
Parameter values: Bh = 10, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, NR = 30, z = 5, µ = 0.01, d = 250, s =
0, Cs = 0. Panel a: m = 05, panel b: m = 0.2.
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Figure S 3: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of helping (black line)
and the six classes of strategies (Cc,Rc,Sc,Pc,Dc, and rest) plotted a function of deme size n.
Parameter values: Bh = 10, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, z = 5, µ = 0.01, d = 250,m =
0.996, Cs = 0. Panel a: NR = 10, s = 0.66667, panel b: NR = 1, s = 0.96667.
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Figure S 4: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of helping (black line)
and the six classes of strategies (Cc,Rc,Sc,Pc,Dc, and rest) plotted a function of deme size n.
Parameter values: Bh = 10, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, NR = 30, z = 5, µ = 0.01, d =
250,m = 0.996, s = 0. Panel a: Cs = 0.1, panel b: Cs = 0.2.
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Figure S 5: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of helping (black line)
and the six classes of strategies (Cc,Rc,Sc,Pc,Dc, and rest) plotted a function of deme size n.
Parameter values: Bh = 10, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, NR = 1, z = 5, µ = 0.01, d = 250,m =
0.5, Cs = 0. Panel a: s = 0, panel b: s = 0.3, panel c: s = 0.6, panel d: s = 0.9.
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Figure S 6: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of helping (black
line) and the six classes of strategies (Cc,Rc,Sc,Pc,Dc, and rest) plotted a function of deme
size n. Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp = 1, NR = 1, µ = 0.01, d = 250,m =
0.996, s = 0.96667. Panel a: Cl = 5, z = 5, Cs = 0.1, panel b: Cl = 5, z = 0, Cs = 0, panel c:
Cl = 5, z = 5, Cs = 00, panel d: Cl = 1, z = 0, Cs = 0.
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Chapter three
A model on grooming up the hierarchy in primates
Status: Preparing to submit to Animal Behaviour
Wubs M, Bshary R, Lehmann L
Contributions: All authors contributed to the conceptual design and the writing of the manuscript.
MW wrote the code and performed the analysis.
Abstract
Primates spend a considerable amount of time grooming each other. Grooming is regularly
found to be traded reciprocally (for grooming) or for rank-related benefits in the presence of
food competition. It has been suggested that if food sources are clustered and monopolizable,
then lower ranked individuals will groom higher ranked ones in order to be tolerated on food
patches. This leads to grooming being directed up the hierarchy. However, the conditions
where grooming up the hierarchy is expected to occur are based on verbal reasoning alone,
and no quantitative analysis of the conditions favouring grooming up the hierarchy appear
in the literature. Here, we develop a model to investigate if food competition can result in
grooming up the hierarchy. Individuals are assumed to take actions pertaining to whom to
groom, where to feed, and whom to tolerate on food patches. By allowing individuals to
choose actions according to reinforcement learning, we delineate conditions where groups of
individuals will express reciprocal grooming and grooming up the hierarchy depending on
environmental conditions (e.g., quality, number of food patches). In particular, we show that
conditions of intense food competition may lead to less grooming up the hierarchy. We suggest
that quantifying the intensity of food competition and the aggressiveness of individuals on a
food source will lead to a better understanding of observed grooming patterns in natural
populations.
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Introduction
Primates spend a significant proportion of their daily time budget grooming other individuals:
picking through fur to remove ectoparasites and clean the skin (social grooming, hereafter groom-
ing) (Dunbar, 1991). This observation comes maybe at no surprise since being groomed is beneficial
due to the removal of ectoparasites (Tanaka and Takefushi, 1993). Furthermore, grooming has an
important social function, where social bonds between individuals are reinforced through the act
of grooming. It has been argued that grooming behaviour has evolved because of these benefits
(Dunbar, 1991). However, there are also costs associated with giving grooming. These come in
the form of opportunity costs (not being able to use the time or energy for other activities), such
as reduced vigilance (Maestripieri, 1993; Barrett and Henzi, 2006). Thus, grooming behaviour can
potentially be exploited, where in a pair of individuals only one makes the investment to groom
and the other reaps the benefit without reciprocating. Understanding the causal proximate and
ultimate factors influencing individual grooming decisions is a long standing goal in primatology
(Seyfarth, 1980; Schino, 2001).
Grooming can be thought of as a commodity that can be traded, where individuals give groom-
ing in order to receive something back. If grooming is solely traded for grooming, then pairs of
individuals are expected to trade equal amounts of grooming. Numerous studies do indeed report a
so-called time-matching of grooming between individuals (Rowell et al., 1991; Barrett et al., 1999;
Leinfelder et al., 2001; Pazol and Cords, 2005). Here, the individuals in a dyad are found to spend
an approximately equal amount of time grooming each other, either within a single grooming bout
or over a longer period of time. However, primate troops are nearly always characterized by a
dominance hierarchy, and grooming interactions occur between individuals of different ranks. In a
significant proportion of studies, grooming is observed to be directed up the hierarchy, i.e., higher
ranked individuals receive more grooming than lower ranked ones. Hence, grooming decisions are
likely to depend here on other factors than just the exchange of grooming. In other words, groom-
ing of high ranked individuals by low ranked individuals is likely to be traded for other benefits
than grooming itself (Seyfarth, 1980; Ventura et al., 2006; Wei et al., 2012; Roubova´ et al., 2015).
What are the benefits that can explain grooming up the hierarchy? The socioecological model
of primatology is concerned with the causes and consequences of food competition and its effect
on social relationships (Kappeler and van Schaik, 2002). Within this framework it is argued that
under conditions where individuals compete over food resources low ranked individuals may trade
grooming for non-grooming benefits provided by high ranked ones (van Schaik, 1989; Sterck et al.,
1997; Kappeler and van Schaik, 2002). If food sources (or patches) are clumped and monopolizable,
then individuals are expected to defend food sources, or attempt to displace one another from these.
Here, coalitions may be formed between individuals, either to defend a food source or to displace
others from it. Then, low ranking individuals may groom higher ranking individuals in order
to gain coalitionary support in agonistic interactions (Seyfarth, 1980; Seyfarth and Cheney, 1984;
Schino, 2007; Carne et al., 2011). Experimental evidence for grooming being traded for coalitionary
support can be found in baboons and vervet monkeys (Cheney et al., 2010; Borgeaud and Bshary,
2015). Due to the trading of grooming by low ranked individuals for such support from high ranked
individuals, on average grooming should be directed up the hierarchy.
Grooming can also be traded for increased tolerance (reduced aggression) for a low ranked
individual by a high ranked one on a food source (Henzi and Barrett, 1999). This relies on broadly
the same ecological conditions as the grooming under the coalitionary support hypothesis. If food
sources are monopolizable then, instead of attempting to displace a higher ranked individual, the
low ranked individual may groom the higher ranked one in order to be tolerated by that individual
on the food source. Like the coalitionary support hypothesis, there is empirical evidence showing
that grooming for tolerance occurs (Ventura et al., 2006; Carne et al., 2011; Tiddi et al., 2011;
Xia et al., 2012). Furthermore, while most primate studies rely on correlational data, it has been
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shown experimentally that vervet monkeys trade grooming for short term tolerance (Borgeaud and
Bshary, 2015).
There exists ample empirical support that grooming may be directed up the hierarchy, either
when it is traded for coalitionary support or for tolerance, but the conditions under which this is
expected to occur are mainly based on verbal models (Wrangham, 1980; van Schaik, 1989; Sterck
et al., 1997). Therefore, there are few quantitative predictions as to the conditions under which
grooming will be directed up the hierarchy and what grooming patterns will be associated with it
(which individuals receive extra grooming) (Dunbar, 2002). One of the few models investigating
grooming up the hierarchy is the one by Seyfarth (Seyfarth, 1977). In this quantitative model
individuals make grooming decisions based on the “attractiveness” of potential recipients. The
attractiveness of an individual as grooming partner depends on the rank of that individual, since
rank influences the likelihood of successfully supporting the focal individual in an agonistic in-
teraction, and thus the highest ranked individual is the most attractive grooming partner. The
model managed to replicate two features that are typically found in various primate species: high
ranking individuals receive more grooming than low ranking ones and individuals of adjacent rank
groom each other more than expected from chance alone (Seyfarth, 1977). In an extension of this
model, various types of competition for grooming access were investigated (Sambrook et al., 1995).
However, both models explicitly assumed that high ranked individuals are attractive grooming
partners, and thus the grooming decisions are not linked directly to the intensity of food competi-
tion itself. It would thus be relevant to have a quantitative model linking endogenously grooming
decisions to the mode of food competition and determined conditions under which grooming up
the hierarchy occurs as an equilibrium behaviour.
Here, we present a reinforcement learning model in which a group of individuals have grooming
and feeding interactions, whose payoff consequences (“rewards”) affect grooming, feeding, and
tolerance decisions. This allows us to determine conditions under which food competition can
lead to grooming being directed up the hierarchy under the grooming for tolerance hypothesis.
Although grooming occurs frequently between kin, a meta-analysis demonstrated a significant
effect of grooming reciprocity among non-kin (Schino and Aureli, 2008). Since our main interest
here is the effect of food competition, we assume that individuals in the model are unrelated.
However, we further assume that individuals spend their entire life together, which corresponds to
the philopatric sex, and this typically means the females in primates (Pusey and Packer, 1987). Our
main questions are: (i) can food competition result in grooming up the hierarchy as an equilibrium
behaviour when individuals decide whom to groom, where to feed and whom to evict, dynamically
according to payoffs, (ii) what kind of grooming patterns are expected if grooming is directed up
the hierarchy (e.g., do all individuals groom the alpha individual, or do they mostly groom one
rank up the hierarchy), and (iii) in how far does the strength of competition (due to the number
of patches or the aggressiveness) modulates the grooming up the hierarchy.
The model
The biological setting
We consider a group of N individuals ranked in a stable, linear dominance hierarchy where individ-
ual i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} has a unique rank ri = i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Individual i = 1 is the lowest ranked
and i = N is the highest ranked or alpha individual. Individuals within this group interact with
each others for T discrete time steps, which can be thought of as the number interactions on a daily
basis, monthly basis, yearly basis, etc. Each interaction time step t = 1, 2, ..., T is characterized
by four sequential behavioural stages: grooming, food patch selection, aggressive interactions, and
feeding, which occur in this order and that we now detail.
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Stage 1 - Grooming
Each individual either selects an individual that it grooms or it grooms no one. The set of actions
available to individual i in this stage is denoted Ai = {0, 1, 2, ..., i− 1, i+ 1, ..., N}, where j ∈ Ai is
the rank of the recipient of the act of grooming, and where j = 0 means that individual i grooms
no one. Grooming incurs a payoff cost c to the groomer, while contributing a payoff benefit b to
the groomee (see table 1 for a list of parameters).
Stage 2 - Selecting a food patch
Each individual selects a food patch out of NP available patches to feed on. We denote by P =
{1, 2, ..., NP} the set of food patches so that action k ∈ P means an individual has selected food
patch k.
Stage 3 - Aggressive interactions
After all individuals have chosen a patch, each individual makes a binary decision, to engage in a
contest or not, for every other individual on the same patch. Because we assume that individuals
can only engage others on the same food patch, we denote by Ei,t ⊆ Ai the set of individuals that
are on the same patch as i at time t.
After each individual has selected their targets (or no one) to engage, a contest occurs between
the aggressor and the target, and the loser of this contest gets evicted from the patch. We adhere
to the following rules for contest. (i) Individual i engaging j is sufficient for a contest to occur
between i and j (it is not required that j also wants to engage i). (ii) To each individual we
associate an array of target individuals. The order in which the contests occur is determined by
random sampling (without replacement) from this array. (iii) Individuals that have lost a single
contest, will not engage in any further contests in the current time step, as they are evicted from
the patch. This thus means that selecting a target to engage does not necessarily mean that the
focal individual and the target will have a contest, as one (or both) of them may be evicted by
another individual before the contest occurs.
We assume that the contest does not incur any costs, as these interactions are often settled
without physical contact (covert interactions). The outcome of each interaction is given by a contest
success function (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1989) so that individual i engaged with j wins the contest with
probability
exp(dri)
exp(dri) + exp(drj)
, (1)
where d ≥ 0 is the dominance gradient, which determines the influence of the ranks of the individ-
uals on the outcome of the contest. If d = 0, then rank has no influence on the outcome and both
individuals are equally likely to win, but if d → ∞ the higher ranked individual is almost certain
to win the contest.
Stage 4 - Feeding
After aggression occurred, individuals feed. We use the interference model to compute the payoff
individuals gain on a given patch (Parker and Sutherland, 1986; Sutherland and Parker, 1992).
The payoff per individual on patch k at time t is given by
piPk,t =
Qk
Nmk,t
, (2)
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where Qk > 0 is the quality of patch k, Nk,t is the number of individuals on patch k at time t
during the feeding stage and thus after contests and eviction occurred. The parameter m ≥ 0
describes the interference between individuals on a food patch (a larger m resulting in a greater
payoff decrease when an extra individual feeds on the patch). Thus an individual benefits from
evicting others as its payoff increases when there are less competitors. After all individuals have
fed, the group mixes again so that in the following time step each individual can have a grooming
interaction with any other individual of the group again.
We consider three different scenarios regarding how the quality of patches is determined. (1)
All patches are of equal quality, so that Qk = q0 for all k and q0 is used as a baseline quality. (2)
Half the patches are of high quality (equal to q0), while the other half are low quality (equal to
0.5q0). In cases where the number of patches is odd, there is one extra high quality patch. (3) The
quality of patch k is given by
Qk = q0(1/1.2)
(k−1), (3)
thus all patches differ in quality, where the quality asymptotically decreases with increasing k.
The learning process
Individuals take actions in three stages during an interaction step: whom to groom, select a
food patch, and whom to evict. We assume that individuals learn which action to play by way
of reinforcement learning. We follow standard reinforcement learning models as used in biology
and game theory (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Camerer and Hua Ho, 1999; Achbany et al.,
2006; Harley, 1981; McNamara and Houston, 1985; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009; Arbilly et al.,
2010, 2011a,b; Dridi and Lehmann, 2014, 2015), and assume that each individual has internal
motivations (or attractions) for each action, which get updated as a function of time according to
payoff received and allows to express actions in a probabilistic way (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine,
1998; Camerer and Hua Ho, 1999; Dridi and Lehmann, 2014, 2015).
Action choice and motivation dynamics
Action choice for grooming (stage 1): The probability pGi,t(j) that individual i takes action
j ∈ Ai during the grooming stage (i.e., grooms individual j 6= i or grooming no one if j = 0) at
time step t is given by
pGi,t(j) =
exp[λMGi,t(j)]∑
q∈Ai
exp[λMGi,t(q)]
, (4)
where MGi,t(j) is the motivation that individual i has at time t for action j ∈ Ai (and can be thought
of as the cumulative reward up to t of taking that action), and is assumed to be a real valued number
(MGi,t(j) ∈ R). Eq. 4 is the standard logit choice rule for reinforcement learning of decision theory
and neuroscience (e.g., Sutton and Barto, 1998; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Camerer and Hua Ho,
1999), and which has been used in behavioural ecology (e.g., Arbilly et al., 2010, 2011a,b; Dridi
and Lehmann, 2015), see (Dridi and Lehmann, 2014) for more details and justifications on the
framework we use here). The parameter λ ≥ 0 therein can be seen as the sensitivity to motivations
or exploration rate: if λ = 0 each action is chosen with equal probability regardless of motivation;
if λ→∞ the action with the highest motivation is chosen almost deterministically: pGi,t(j)→ 1.
The change ∆MGi,t(j) = M
G
i,t+1(j) −MGi,t(j) in motivation (or attraction) of individual i for
action j ∈ Ai at time step t ≥ 1 is assumed to take the form
∆MGi,t(j) = −δMGi,t(j) + piGij,t + piFij,t. (5)
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The first term on the right-hand-side is a decay of motivation (for instance due to loss of memory)
of i for action j, with discount factor δ. The second term, piGij,t, reflects the change in motivation
due to grooming and is given by
piGij,t =
{
bIGj→i,t − cIGi→j,t, if j ∈ Ai \ 0
γIGi→j,t, if j = 0,
(6)
where IGi→j,t is an indicator function equal to 1 if i grooms j at time t, 0 otherwise. The payoff γ
that i obtains if it grooms no one can be interpreted as the psychological reward of not grooming.
Thus in words, assuming b, c > 0, the motivation of individual i to groom j increases with receiving
grooming from j, but decreases if i grooms j.
The third term in eq. 5 is the (motivational) payoff
piFij,t = I
C
ij,tpi
P
k(ij),t
(
1
2
− exp(dri)
exp(dri) + exp(drj)
)
(7)
due to co-feeding. This depends on ICij,t, which is equal to 1 if i and j feed on the same patch
at time t, zero otherwise. When i and j feed on the same patch individual i obtains ma-
terial payoff piPk(ij),t (eq. 2), where k(ij) is the patch on which i and j co-feed. We assume
that the motivation reinforcement due to co-feeding (eq. 7) is proportional to this payoff and
(1/2− exp(riD)/[exp(riD) + exp(rjD)]). This is positive if i has a lower ranked than j, negative
otherwise. Hence, we assume that a high ranked individual will decrease its motivation to groom
a lower ranked one after feeding together on a patch, while the low ranked individual will increase
its motivation to groom the high ranked one.
We note that the reinforcement learning rule for motivation implemented by eq. 5 (and the
forthcoming ones) is an example of the the so-called relative payoff sum rule (Harley, 1981; Hamblin
and Giraldeau, 2009; Dridi and Lehmann, 2014), where payoff over time is simply accumulated,
and where the cumulated payoff decays at rate δ.
Action choice for patch selection (stage 2): The probability that at time t individual i
selects patch k ∈ P for feeding is assumed to be given by
pPi,t(k) =
exp[λMPi,t(k)]∑
q∈P
exp[λMPi,t(q)]
, (8)
which is similar to stage 1 (eq. 4) and where the change in the motivation MPi,t(k) that individual
i has at time t for patch k ∈ P is updated as follows
∆MPi,t(k) = −δMPi,t(k) + piPk,tIPik,t. (9)
The first term is again the discounted motivation and the second term is the patch payoff to
an individual multiplied by the indicator for the individual on the patch, as in eq. 7. Note that,
individuals that have been kicked out of a patch do not positively reinforce their patch motivations.
Action choice for aggression (stage 3): To determine action choice for this stage, we let
MTi,t(j) represent the motivation of individual i to tolerate individual j (“the tolerance”). The
change ∆MTi,t(j) = M
T
i,t+1(j)−MTi,t(j) in tolerance is assumed to occur as follows:
∆MTi,t(j) = −δMTi,t(j) + bIGj→i,t − IAij,tIEij,t, (10)
where the first term is the discounted motivation, the second term is the increase in tolerance if
i has been groomed by j in round t (as in eq. 6), and the third term is the change in motivation
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as a result of the outcome of aggressive interactions, which depends on the parameter  giving the
impact of eviction on the motivation. In this third term, IAij,t takes value 1 if a contest occurred
between i and j in round t, and 0 otherwise, and IEij,t takes value 1 if i won the contest, otherwise
it takes value −1 (where probabilities of wining a contest is given by eq. 1). Hence, the winner of
the contest decreases its motivation to tolerate the loser of the contest, while the loser increases it.
In this stage, each individual takes a sequence of eviction decisions, one for each individual in
its patch (one for each j ∈ Ei,t). We assume that the probability pTi,t(j) that individual i wants to
evict j is given by
pTi,t(j) =
1
1 + exp[(MTi,t(j)− β)]
. (11)
This is a logistic function bounded between 0 and 1 (see Fig. 1), where the probability of engage-
ment decreases with increasing motivation. As such, the function ensures that a higher tolerance
motivation for individual j results in a lower probability of engaging that individual. The param-
eter β can be seen as the intrinsic aggressiveness of the individuals, as it regulates the probability
that i will engage j with for a given value of its motivation to engage j, since with the same
motivation a larger value for β increases the probability that i engages j (Fig. 1).
We note that motivations can become negative in the model (the last term in eq. 10 may induce
negative motivation), and so β can be negative. But what matters for decision making is not the
sign of the motivations, only their ranking and the model could be rescaled, such that motivations
are only positive, but we refrain from doing so for simplicity of presentation and model analysis.
Descriptors of interactions
To recapitulate, the model allows to track the actions and the outcome of actions of each individual
i for each round t of interaction ; that is, whether or not it grooms individual j (IGi→j,t ∈ {0, 1}),
whether or not it feeds on patch k (IPik,t ∈ {0, 1}), whether or not it tries to evict j (IAij,t ∈ {0, 1}),
whether it wins or looses a contest against j (IEij,t ∈ {1,−1}), and thus to determine with whom it
co-feeds (ICij,t ∈ {0, 1}). This in turn allows to describe the networks of interactions, which are of
two kind. First, the grooming network (how much each individual grooms every other individual in
the group), and second the feeding association network (proportion of time that pairs of individuals
feed together), which can both be represented as graphs (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
To described these networks, we first let the learning process run for Teq < T time steps so that
it reaches a quasi-equilibrium state and then characterize the networks in this state as follows. For
the grooming network we computed the fraction gij of time that individual i spends grooming j
at a quasi-equilibrium of the learning process. This is defined as
gij =
1
(T − Teq)
T∑
t=Teq+1
IGi→j,t, (12)
where T − Teq is the amount of time we record the grooming interactions at quasi-equilibrium,
whereby gi0 is the fraction of time i grooms no one. From gij , we also computed the average
fraction of time that i receives grooming as
gi =
1
N
N∑
j=1
gji, (13)
whereby 1− gi gives the fraction of time i is not groomed.
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Since we are interested in characterizing the grooming patterns, we quantify the proportion of
the grooming actions that are directed up the hierarchy as
hu =
1
(T − Teq)
T∑
t=Teq+1
∑N
i=1
∑N
j>i I
G
i→j,t∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 I
G
i→j,t
, (14)
which varies between zero and one (0 ≤ hu ≤ 1). The numerator in the second ratio is the number
of grooming actions in the group at time t that are directed towards an individual with a higher
rank, while the denominator is the total number of grooming actions at that time. As such, if
hu = 0.5 the amount of grooming received by higher ranked individuals is equal to the amount
of grooming received by lower ranked individuals, while if hu = 1 then all grooming actions are
directed towards an individual with a higher rank. Furthermore, to describe in more details the
pattern of grooming up the hierarchy, we also consider
hα =
1
(T − Teq)
T∑
t=Teq+1
∑N−1
i=1 I
G
i→N,t∑N−1
i=1
∑N
j=1 I
G
i→j,t
, (15)
where the numerator in the second ratio is the total number of grooming actions directed towards
the highest ranked individual (the “alpha individual” which has rank N), and the denominator is
the total number of grooming actions. Hence, hα ∈ [0, 1] gives the fraction of grooming (among all
grooming interactions) directed towards the alpha individual, while
h1 =
1
(T − Teq)
T∑
t=Teq+1
∑N−1
i=1 I
G
i→i+1,t∑N−1
i=1
∑N
j=1 I
G
i→j,t
, (16)
gives the fraction of grooming that is is directed one rank up the hierarchy (we also have h1 ∈ [0, 1]).
In order to characterize the feeding association network, we compute the frequency of feeding
association between individuals i and j (aij) as,
aij =
1
(T − Teq)
T∑
t=Teq+1
ICij,t, (17)
where ICij,t is the co-feeding indicator function. We also compute the (quasi-equilibrium) frequency
that individual i is not evicted and thus feeds on a patch (fi) as,
fi = 1−
1
(T − Teq)
T∑
t=Teq+1
N∑
j=1
−IAij,t0.5(IEij,t − 1), (18)
where the second term is the fraction of time individual i has been evicted. We subtract 1 to IEij,t
to avoid counting the instances where individual i has won a contest (where IEij,t = 1). Finally,
we computed (at the quasi-stationary equilibrium), the average level of tolerance τ ∈ [0, 1] over all
individuals in the population, and which is defined as the fraction of time that an individual has
not engaged a partner, given that it is not alone on its patch. If τ = 0, an individual never tries
to evict a partner, while if τ = 1 an individual always try to evict a partner, given that it is not
alone on a patch.
Because the model is stochastic and highly non-linear we implemented it via individual-based
simulations and tracked the actions and statistical descriptors numerically (simulation file can
be obtained on request). For all reported results (see next section) we set all motivations of all
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individuals initially to 0 (i.e., MGi,0 = M
P
i,0 = M
T
i,0 = 0), which implies actions are uniformly
distributed, and then let the model run for T = 5000 time steps while using a period of Teq = 4000
to reach the quasi-equilibrium state. We verified that Teq = 4000 time steps were generally enough
to reach a quasi-equilibrium state, as the pattern of variation in the hierarchy score (hu) between
replicates remains stable after 500-2000 time steps (see the supplementary material). Assuming
about 7 grooming interactions per day (e.g., rhesus monkeys, Lindburg, 1971), a period of 4000
time steps means a learning period of 1.5 years. To assess sensitivity to initial conditions we run 10
replicates for each set of parameter values, and thus when we report hierarchy scores (hu, hα, h1)
and tolerance level (τ), we report their means (and sometimes standard errors).
The outcome of the model will be different grooming and association networks, depending
on the intensity of food competition and other model parameters. Although the model uses a
large number of parameters, our main interest is in the parameters that regulate the intensity
of the competition and the value of the rewards (table 1). The main parameters varied here are
the number of patches (NP), the aggressiveness (β), the benefit of grooming (b), the dominance
gradient (d), and the effect of patch quality (q0), while we investigate the effect of varying group
size (N) and the level of interference (m) in the supplementary material.
Results
In order to gain intuition about the outcomes of the model, we first consider two special cases:
grooming without food competition (that is, no patch selection, aggressive interactions, and feed-
ing) and food competition without grooming. Unless stated otherwise, all forthcoming results are
based on the following baseline parameter values: c = 1, b = 3, γ = 0.5, λ = 0.25, δ = 0.1, β =
1,  = 1, d = 2, q0 = 6,m = 0.5, N = 10 (table 1).
Uncoupled model
Grooming for grooming
In order to understand the incentive structure in our model, we start with the simplest case of
grooming interactions for group size N = 2 (skipping stage 2, 3, and 4 of an interaction round).
In this case, grooming motivations are only reinforced by receiving grooming (eq. 5 with ICij,t =
0 always). This allows to investigate the conditions under which grooming as an equilibrium
behaviour emerges (as opposed to choosing the non-grooming action “0”). For this case, we show
in the supplementary material that when λ dominates δ (λ  δ so that reinforcement dominates
stochastic choice), the change in the probabilities pG1,t(2) and p
G
1,t(2) that individual 1 grooms 2
and 2 grooms 1, respectively, can be approximated by the following differential equations
dpG1,t(2)
dt
= λ
(
1− pG1,t(2)
) [
pG2,t(1)b−
(
pG1,t(2)c+
(
1− pG1,t(2)
)
γ
)]
dpG2,t(1)
dt
= λ
(
1− pG2,t(1)
) [
pG1,t(2)b−
(
pG1,t(2)c+
(
1− pG1,t(2)
)
γ
)]
. (19)
This shows that an individual will increase the tendency to groom its partner proportionally to
the level of grooming of the partner multiplied by the benefit b. The individual will decrease its
grooming according to a term (second one in parenthesis in each equation) that can be thought off
as the average of the cost c of grooming and the reward γ of not grooming. Eq. 19 makes explicit
that if both interacting partner have an initial tendency to groom (pG1,0(2) > 0 and p
G
2,0(1) > 0),
then it is possible that the learning dynamic converges to both individuals grooming each other.
This is due to grooming being “reciprocated” and thus reinforced over time. On the other hand,
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if an individual interacts with another that has a very low grooming tendency, then it will not get
exploited and will reduce its level of grooming.
Eq. 19 thus encapsulates the core behavioural assumptions behind our model and from a quan-
titative point of view, the global dynamics of learning depends on the parameter values. For
instance, while fixing b = 3 and c = 1, we find that for γ = 0.5 pairs always end up grooming
each other as the reinforcement when choosing the non-grooming action is very low (Fig. 2). For
γ = 2 (which is equal to b − c) we find that half the pairs end up grooming, while the other half
ends up not grooming. The reinforcement that individuals receive when grooming while receiving
grooming (b − c) or when both do not groom (γ) is sufficiently high to converge on playing that
action only (Fig. 2). For γ = 5 the reinforcement for not grooming is larger than grooming an
individual that grooms back (γ > b− c), and most pairs end up not grooming.
For the remainder of the results we set γ = 0.5, as we want grooming to emerge, and then
determine when it will be directed up the hierarchy. For instance, for N = 10 with γ = 0.5 we
find that (while still skipping stage 2, 3, and 4) there exists virtually no variation in grooming
propensity between individuals, and all individuals spent at least 98% of their time grooming
others. Although giving grooming decreases the motivation to repeat that action, giving grooming
to an individual that gives grooming back results in an overall increase in the motivation to groom
that individual (since we always assume b > c in eq. 5). As such, we expect and find that all
individuals converge on grooming a single individuals predominantly, that also almost exclusively
groom them back (Fig. 3a). Pairs of individuals thus trade equal amounts of grooming in the
absence of food competition. This corresponds to the time-matching of grooming that is regularly
found in primates (e.g., Schino et al., 2003).
Tolerance without grooming
If the grooming stage is skipped, individuals can still select a patch to feed, evict targets, and
feed, but there can be no grooming for tolerance. In this case, tolerance motivation no longer
depends on grooming (eq. 10 with IGj→i,t = 0 always), but can still depend on the contests that
have occurred, and where the number of contests depends on the intrinsic aggressiveness of the
individuals (eq. 11). We thus find that a larger β (higher aggressiveness) results in less tolerance
(Fig. 3b). Additionally, the number of patches (NP) influences the average number of competitors
on a patch, which in turn influences the likelihood of engaging at least one other individual. Thus
fewer patches means more competitors on the same patch and therefore less tolerance (Fig. 3b).
Full model
Grooming up the hierarchy for tolerance
We now analyze how grooming for tolerance occurs in the full model (allowing all four interaction
stages to occur). We find that if there is food competition, not all individuals manage to feed on
a patch and several individuals get evicted. Regularly no more than two individuals feed on the
same patch (Fig. 4a, c). A third (lower ranked) individual on the same patch would not to be
tolerated by at least one other individual and thus gets evicted. Hence, individuals tend to feed as
dyads.
Although the distribution of the highest ranked individuals over the available food patches
differs between replicates of simulations, the highest ranked individuals consistently segregate over
the patches in order to avoid competition with one another (Fig. 4a, c). Between the individuals
that feed together on a patch, the lower ranked individual always grooms the higher ranked one
more than the higher ranked individual grooms back, and is the only individual that is tolerated
by the higher ranked one (Fig. 4b, d). This is quantitatively captured by our hierarchy score, hu,
which is systematically above 0.5 (Figs. 5, 7). For individuals that do not co-feed on a patch, the
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grooming between them is either balanced or absent. Thus only when individuals feed together
an imbalance of grooming within that pair is created where the higher ranked individual receives
additional grooming. Due to the imbalance of grooming between individuals sharing a patch
(the lower ranked grooming more), we can thus conclude that our model generates grooming for
tolerance; namely, grooming is exchanged for tolerance during feeding.
We also find that grooming up the hierarchy follows a systematic qualitative pattern in which the
more there is grooming up the hierarchy, the more this is directed towards the alpha individual.
We indeed find a strong positive correlation between hu and hα (Pearson’s r = 0.48, Fig. 5).
Conversely, the grooming just one rank up the hierarchy (h1) is negatively correlated with hu
(Pearson’s r = −0.15). From the feeding associations, like in Fig. 4, this is not surprising, since
closely ranked individuals segregate over the available food patches and thus do not need to groom
each other in order to be tolerated on a patch. Occasionally neighbour ranked individuals may
share a patch, but it is clear from our results that grooming up the hierarchy is a result of the
highest ranked individuals (in particular the alpha) receive additional grooming and not because
individuals groom one rank up the hierarchy.
Conditions favouring grooming for tolerance
We now delineate how grooming up the hierarchy depends on various parameters, like patch number
and quality (affecting competition), aggressiveness and dominance gradient, and grooming costs
and benefits.
We find that grooming up the hierarchy depends markedly on competition for resources. Indeed,
the hierarchy score depends strongly on the number of available food patches (Fig. 5b). If there
is just a single patch to feed on (NP = 1), competition for feeding is high, and thus there is
little tolerance (τ = 0.04). Most individuals are evicted from the patch, and will not groom for
tolerance, resulting in a hierarchy score close to 0.5 (hu = 0.52). The slight amount of grooming
that does occur up the hierarchy (since hu > 0.5) is due to the second highest ranked individual
being tolerated and grooming the alpha.
If the number of food patches is increased, individuals will segregate over the available patches
(see Fig. 4). Fewer individuals per patch means there will be less competition within each patch
and thus more tolerance (Fig. 3b). The highest ranked individual on each patch is likely to tolerate
one other individual in exchange for grooming (Fig. 4), and since these exchanges of grooming for
tolerance occur more frequently if there are more patches, then there will consequently be more
grooming up the hierarchy (Fig. 5b). Most grooming up the hierarchy occurs for NP = 4 (hu =
0.61). A further increase in the number of patches results in alleviating some of the competition, as
individuals may sometimes find themselves alone on a patch, and therefore less tolerance and thus
grooming up the hierarchy is required. We thus observe that the hierarchy score is non-monotonic
in number of food patches, first increasing and then decreasing for NP > 4 (Fig. 5b). However, even
for high NP there remains an overall tendency to groom up the hierarchy (hu = 0.58 for NP = 10),
since the extra patches are of such low quality that individuals avoid feeding on these (quality of
the best patch: Q1 = 6, worst patch: Q10 = 1.16). In the online supplementary material we show
that if there are as many patches as individuals and all patches are of equal quality, then grooming
is completely reciprocal (hu = 0.50), since there is no co-feeding and grooming for tolerance is not
required (Fig. S2). Thus, in the absence of competition for resources we recover the grooming for
grooming results (section “Grooming for grooming”).
For the effect of patch quality on grooming, we find that when this quality is ranked (eq. 3)
lowering the baseline quality, q0, results in less grooming up the hierarchy. A lower patch quality
means that individuals gain less material (and thus motivational) payoff on patches, and thus
motivations for patch choice are less strongly affected from feeding (eq. 9). Individuals are then
more likely to choose different patches at each time step and therefore encounter different individ-
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uals on the patch regularly. Strong feeding associations between individuals (i.e., feeding together
regularly) will therefore not occur and thus there will be little grooming for tolerance (Fig. 6).
Increasing patch quality increases grooming up the hierarchy, because higher ranked individuals
will be less inclined to groom lower ranked individuals, while lower ranked individuals will reward
higher ranking ones even more (eq. 5). Evicting another individual has a fixed effect on tolerance
motivation, and the effect of being groomed outweighed the effect of evicting (b > ). Therefore, if
only the patch quality (q0) changes, dominant individuals would continue to tolerate subordinates.
Grooming up the hierarchy also depends on the intrinsic aggressiveness of individuals (β). Low-
ering β means individuals are less likely to engage others for eviction (in stage 3 of the interaction
stage), and individuals are tolerated more often (Fig. 3b). A consequence of more tolerance is
that low ranked individuals are more likely to reward higher ranked individuals with grooming and
grooming up the hierarchy increases (Fig. 7a). The effect of changing aggressiveness is most clear
under conditions of high food competition (i.e., low number of food patches). For NP = 1 and
β = −3 the tolerance is greatly increased (τ = 0.84) as well as the hierarchy score (hu = 0.81).
Conversely, higher aggressiveness (β = 3) increases the number of contests, thus lowering the toler-
ance. Then, if low ranked individuals are not tolerated on food patches, they do not groom higher
ranked ones in return. As such, increasing β results in less tolerance and thus grooming becoming
more reciprocal (i.e., hu → 0.5), and for NP = 4 we find hu = 0.56 (Fig. 7b).
We find that a positive dominance gradient (d) is needed for grooming to be directed up the
hierarchy. If d = 0, all individuals are symmetrical. In this case, no individual can consistently
control a food patch by evicting others, since each individual has a 0.5 probability to win a contest
with every other individual (eq. 1). For d = 0 we thus find that hu = 0.5 for any number of
patches (NP), showing that the intensity of food competition has no effect on grooming decisions.
If individuals are symmetrical, we thus recover that grooming is exchanged for grooming (Fig. 8).
For d = 2 the probability to win a contest with an individual one rank below is 0.88 (eq. 1) and
thus a higher ranked individual already wins most contests. We find that increasing the dominance
gradient has little effect on the hierarchy scores as the contest success function (eq. 1) saturates
(e.g., d = 10, Fig. 8).
Finally, we investigated how the cost to benefit ratio of grooming affects grooming up the
hierarchy by varying the benefit b (but always holding b > c). If b is large, grooming motivations
are increasingly controlled by whom an individual is groomed (eq. 5), and thus grooming will
become increasingly reciprocal (for b = 4.5 we find hu = 0.5 regardless of number of patches;
Fig. 9). The tolerance motivation similarly increase with b (eq. 10), and thus we continue to find
individuals feeding together, but with reduced asymmetry of grooming between them. Hence, we
have grooming for grooming with high tolerance. If b is low, we again observe a high tendency to
reciprocal grooming, since tolerance motivations will be less affected by receiving grooming (Fig. 9).
Concomitantly one then has less tolerance overall. This shows that the benefit of grooming (b) has
a non-monotonic effect on grooming up the hierarchy.
Sensitivity of the results
In the online supplementary material, we present several additional results to test the robustness
of our qualitative results. We show that the assumption regarding the distribution of patch quality
(whether patches are of equal quality or of low and high quality, see eq. 3) has a surprisingly
small effect on the outcome (Fig. S2). We also vary the group size N and the interference while
feeding (m) and find that we can reproduce qualitatively similar levels of grooming up the hierarchy
(Fig. S3 and Fig. S4). Increasing group size lowers the grooming up the hierarchy slightly, however,
since more dyads groom reciprocally, while increasing interference has a similar effect as lowering
patch quality (q0) as both affect the payoff an individual gain on a patch, and thus influence the
strength of feeding associations between individuals. Finally, we attempted to create conditions
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where individuals preferentially groom one rank up the hierarchy (instead of the alpha individual).
We do this by having patch payoff decrease dramatically if more than two individual feed on
the same patch. Then, by creating substantial differences between patch quality we expect that
mostly the highest ranked individuals feed together on the highest quality patch, the third and
fourth ranked individuals on the second highest quality patch, and so forth. However, we find even
under such conditions that grooming up the hierarchy is preferentially directed towards the alpha
individual (hα > h1, Fig. S5).
Discussion
Grooming is maybe the most documented behaviour in the primate literature, as it is both relatively
easy to quantify and understanding its occurrence is a major goal in primatology (Seyfarth, 1980;
Schino, 2001). Grooming is regularly found to be directed up the hierarchy, where lower ranked
individuals groom higher ranked ones. It has been argued that this occurs when there is competition
for food, where low ranked individuals trade grooming for either tolerance or coalitionary support
from high ranked individuals. To better understand the conditions under which this is likely
to occur, we developed here a quantitative reinforcement learning model, where individuals take
decisions on whom to groom, where to feed, and whom to tolerate on a food patch, and where these
actions depend dynamically on payoffs. With this model we have investigated if food competition
can result in grooming being directed up the hierarchy (qualitatively), what are the grooming
patterns that emerge (which individuals receive additional grooming), and under which conditions
it is likely to occur (and break down).
Grooming for tolerance
Our main finding is that low ranked individuals are indeed likely to trade grooming for tolerance
from high ranked individuals (Fig. 4) leading to grooming being directed up the hierarchy (Fig. 5).
This matches the empirical observations made in various primate species where grooming is regu-
larly found to be traded for tolerance (Ventura et al., 2006; Carne et al., 2011; Tiddi et al., 2011;
Xia et al., 2012; Borgeaud and Bshary, 2015).
Our model thus demonstrates that grooming can be traded for tolerance as a result of food
competition. Seyfarth’s simulation model on grooming in female monkeys was seminal in explicitly
investigating grooming patterns. The model was relatively simple in the sense that the individuals
in the model only made grooming decisions, and were assumed to have an innate preference to
groom the highest ranking individuals (Seyfarth, 1977). However, under conditions where high
ranked individuals cannot provide an alternative benefit to grooming (e.g., tolerance or coalitionary
support), low ranked individuals should adjust their grooming preferences accordingly. With a
fixed preference, individuals would always groom up the hierarchy. The current work is thus a
logical next step, since we allowed grooming preferences (motivation) to vary between individuals
and over time. Our model successfully produced, depending on the state of the environment, both
grooming for tolerance and grooming for grooming, the latter not being possible in Seyfarth’s model
(Seyfarth, 1977). Our results thus demonstrate that dynamic motivations (or preferences) that are
updated through learning can capture a wider range of grooming patterns, and that grooming up
the hierarchy depends crucially on ecological and behavioural conditions.
The pattern of grooming up the hierarchy
We find that grooming up the hierarchy is mostly the result of the alpha individual receiving
additional grooming, but not the individual one rank up the hierarchy (Fig. 5). It has been
argued that all individuals in a primate troop should be willing to preferentially groom the alpha
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individual (followed by the second highest ranked individual, etc.), but that, at the same time, there
is competition for grooming access, which means that not all individuals can groom their preferred
target. Consequently, most individuals may end up grooming adjacent ranked individuals instead
(Seyfarth, 1977, 1980). However, both the evidence for competition for grooming access and more
grooming between adjacent ranked individuals is mixed (in favour of competition for grooming
access: (Fairbanks, 1980; Schino, 2001), against: (Silk, 1982; Henzi et al., 2003); in favour of
grooming adjacent ranked: (Seyfarth, 1977, 1980), against: (Thierry et al., 1990; O’Brien, 1993)).
Therefore, it is worth investigating what conditions lead to competition for grooming access or
increased grooming of adjacent ranked individuals.
In our model we do not find preferential grooming of individuals one rank above in the hierarchy.
Interestingly, we find that adjacent ranked individuals tend to avoid one another in order to be the
highest ranked individual on their chosen food patch (Fig. 4). In the absence of feeding associations
between adjacent ranked individuals, there is no incentive for the lower ranked individual to groom
the higher ranked one for tolerance. Therefore, the factors causing individuals to groom one rank up
or down the hierarchy need further investigation, but it seems unlikely that this is directly caused
by food competition. An interesting/logical extension of the current model would be to introduce
some form of competition for grooming partners in order to investigate if such a restriction will
result in individuals grooming adjacent ranked individuals more frequently.
Conditions where grooming up the hierarchy occurs and breaks down
We have quantified how the intensity of food competition (due to the number of food patches,
aggressiveness, etc) modulates the grooming up the hierarchy. The so-called socioecological model
(Sterck et al., 1997) tries to understand how food competition, predation risk, and infanticide risk
determine various aspects of primate societies (e.g., patterns of migration, dominance hierarchies,
and grooming behaviour) (van Schaik, 1996; Sterck et al., 1997; Koenig, 2002; Kappeler and van
Schaik, 2002). While the socioecological model predicts that food competition may cause grooming
to be directed up the hierarchy, it does not give quantitative predictions regarding how the intensity
of food competition will modulate the grooming patterns (it only distinguishes between types of
competitions, Sterck et al., 1997).
Using the socioecological model as a premise for our own analysis, we find that our model
replicates a variety of findings in the primate literature where grooming is directed up the hier-
archy due to food competition (Ventura et al., 2006; Carne et al., 2011; Tiddi et al., 2011; Xia
et al., 2012). Although it is argued in these studies that grooming is traded for tolerance on food
sources, the intensity of food competition is rarely investigated. However, our model shows that
the relationship between food competition and grooming up the hierarchy is not necessarily linear
(Fig. 5). Therefore, in order to better understand observed patterns of grooming behaviour in
primates, it is crucial to quantify the intensity of food competition.
Additionally, we identified conditions under which grooming will be traded for grooming instead
of tolerance. For example, the model predicts that when there is a sufficient number of high quality
patches available grooming will be reciprocal (Fig. S2). This matches the finding by Pazol and
Cords (Pazol and Cords, 2005) where, despite the presence of a dominance hierarchy, blue monkeys
actively avoided one another while feeding, and high and low ranking individuals therefore received
equal amounts of grooming. Similarly, in baboon troops where individuals did not compete for
resources, a strong time-matching pattern of grooming was found (Barrett et al., 1999).
Our model also predicts that high aggressiveness can lead to less grooming up the hierarchy
(Fig. 7). This conforms to the finding of Leinfelder (Leinfelder et al., 2001), where grooming is solely
traded for grooming, despite the presence of monopolizable food sources, and this is attributed
to high food-related aggression (Leinfelder et al., 2001). Obviously, aggressiveness varies between
individuals, groups, and species (Isbell, 1991; Fairbanks et al., 2004). However, for the sake of
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simplicity we used a single parameter to set the aggressiveness of all individuals here. This showed
that high aggression results in grooming being traded for grooming. Further work is required to
investigate how grooming networks are affected if aggressiveness can vary between individuals.
Finally, there may exist other factors that are not captured in our model, which also can favour
reciprocal grooming over grooming up the hierarchy. For example, in a troop of blue monkeys
grooming was found to be traded reciprocally, but this appeared to be the result of intense between
group competition, which increases the importance of group cohesiveness leading to equal shares
of grooming within dyads (Rowell et al., 1991). Since we investigated grooming only as a result of
within group competition, such effects could not occur in our model.
Emotional bookkeeping
Although primates reciprocate grooming and trade grooming for other commodities, the mecha-
nistic processes underlying these decisions are difficult to unravel. One of the hypothesized expla-
nations how primates take actions in a social context is through emotional bookkeeping (Aureli
and Schaffner, 2002; Schino and Aureli, 2009, 2017). Primates are thought to have partner-specific
emotions that guide their decision making process. Receiving benefits, in various currencies, are
translated into single variables (emotions) in an individual towards those that provided the benefit.
Through social interactions individuals will form differential social relationships. The emotions can
thus be seen as a measure of the relationship quality, and will determine the actions an individual
takes in a social context. Evidence supporting emotional bookkeeping has been found in various
species (Schino et al., 2009; Schino and Pellegrini, 2009).
Our model can be interpreted as an application of emotional bookkeeping, where the motiva-
tions can be seen as emotional states, since they reflect the history of interactions between the
individuals. Different currencies are translated into a single motivation: both tolerance and re-
ceiving grooming affect the grooming motivation (eq. 5). Although emotional bookkeeping has,
until now, only been described verbally, our model provides a quantitative example of how partner
specific motivations (or emotions) may be updated through interactions with social partners or
decay over time. Different types of interactions (grooming, co-feeding, contests) can all affect a
single motivation, which consequently will determine the actions an individual takes. Our model
shows that through such updating mechanisms stable grooming bonds can be formed between in-
dividuals, while at the same time it allows for interchange of currencies (grooming for tolerance)
between individuals of different ranks (Fig. 4).
Assumptions of the model
Our model is a proximate one that captures grooming and feeding actions in a group of interacting
individuals, and we did not study the evolution of the decision rules here. Therefore, we have
made a variety of assumptions for this model, especially regarding how motivations are updated
as a result of payoff received.
We use a reinforcement learning model (instead of an evolutionary model) because both food
sources and grooming partners widely fluctuate in a primate’s life (Borgeaud et al., 2016), which
makes it likely that social strategies are learned as it allows individuals to respond to the variation in
social partners and the environment it will experience over time. We assumed that the motivation
to groom another increases with receiving grooming from that individual, while it decreases with
giving grooming to that individual. Such updating matches the evolution of reciprocal strategies
in many models on social evolution, the most well-known being tit-for-tat, which can be seen as
a simple learning strategy (Dridi and Lehmann, 2014). We choose parameter values such that
grooming is favoured (see Fig. 2). The assumptions of our model thus do not favour “cheating”
behaviour (choosing not to groom), since grooming acts are likely to be reciprocated. We were
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interested in patterns of grooming behaviour here, and not in how individuals can avoid being
cheated. Regarding tolerance, we assumed that winning a contest would increase the probability
to engage the same individual in future time steps (thus becoming less tolerant). Since evicting
another from a food patch is likely to increase the payoff of the evicting individual in nature,
repeating such an action will increase its payoff similarly in future time steps, and such a learning
rule is thus likely to increase the payoff overall. Finally, we assumed that receiving grooming will
increase the tolerance towards the groomer, which has been shown experimentally (Borgeaud and
Bshary, 2015), and we assumed that tolerating a lower ranked causes the higher ranked to be
less likely to groom that individual, which is a logical consequence if grooming is to be traded for
tolerance instead of both tolerance and grooming.
Outlook for empiricists
Our model generates patterns of grooming reciprocity (trading grooming for grooming) and groom-
ing up the hierarchy (trading grooming for tolerance), which matches a number of grooming pat-
terns in natural populations. These different patterns emerge from the model by varying its
parameters. First, varying the level of food competition, as regulated through the number of food
patches, can result in complete reciprocal grooming (given a sufficient number of high quality
patches), as well as in strong grooming up the hierarchy if competition increases, although high
levels of competition may also decrease the grooming up the hierarchy. Therefore, a proper under-
standing of the intensity of the food competition in natural populations is crucial in understanding
the observed grooming pattern. Second, high aggressiveness suppresses grooming up the hierarchy.
Quantifying the variation in food related aggressiveness between species, populations, and even
individuals can help explain the absence or presence of grooming up the hierarchy. Additional
interesting factors to measure, albeit more difficult to assess, are the patch qualities and inter-
ference as they tend to influence the feeding associations that form between individuals, and this
will influence whether grooming is traded for tolerance. Overall, a better understanding of these
factors, will help improve our understanding of grooming behaviours and social relationships in
primates.
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Table and figures
Table 1: List of model parameters. The parameters in bold are varied to investigate its effect on
the hierarchy score (hu).
Parameter Equations Meaning
c 6 Cost of grooming
b 6, 10 Benefit of being groomed
γ 6 Change in motivation when not grooming
λ 4, 8 Exploration rate
δ 5, 9, 10 Discount factor
β 11 Regulate engage probability
 10 Impact of eviction
d 1, 5 Dominance gradient
q0 3 Reference patch quality
m 2 Interference
N Group size
NP Number of patches
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Figure 1: Probability to engage an individual as a function of the motivation (eq. 11). A higher tol-
erance motivation decreases the probability to engage the individual, while a higher aggressiveness
increases the probability to engage.
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Figure 2: Solution orbits of the approximate learning dynamics given by eq. 1 of the SI (a refined
version of eq. 19)and corresponding results obtained from individual-based simulations for the case:
c = 1, b = 3, λ = 0.25, δ = 0.1, N = 2. Upper panels: the solution orbits describe the direction of
change of action choice and where the system will end up (either both partner groom each or they
do not groom). Lower panels: individual-based simulations show the realizations of the (stochastic)
model, averaged over 1000 replicates from three different initial conditions for the probability to
groom at t = 1: 0.5, 0.25, and 0.1. Left columns shows the results for γ = 0.5, middle column for
γ = 2, and right column for γ = 5. Dashed line in the bottom row are player 1, and the dotted
lines player 2. Note that for γ = 2 a single player does not groom half the time, but instead half
the pairs converge on grooming only and the other half on non-grooming only.
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a) Grooming network in the
absence of food competition
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b) Tolerance (τ) in the
absence of grooming
β= − 3
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Figure 3: Panel a: typical grooming network when only the grooming stage occurs (no patch selec-
tion, aggressive interactions, and feeding). Vertex size correlates with the proportion of grooming
it receives (gi), while the edges correlate with the grooming i gives to j (gij). Individuals tend to
form grooming pairs, where the members of the pair groom each other equally much. For clarity,
grooming proportions below 0.10 (gij < 0.10) are not plotted. Panel b: tolerance (τ , mean and
error bars) as a function of the number of patches, in the absence of grooming. Increasing β
decreases the tolerance τ . Parameter values: c = 1, b = 3, γ = 0.5, λ = 0.25, δ = 0.1,  = 1, d =
2, q0 = 6,m = 0.5, N = 10, with patch quality given by eq. 3.
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Figure 4: Feeding associations and grooming network for identical parameter values as in Fig. 3
and β = 1, but allowing for all interactions. Top row: NP = 2, bottom row: NP = 5. In the
feeding association network the vertex size correlates with the frequency it feeds (fi) while the
edges correlate with the frequency i and j co-feed (aij). In the grooming network the vertex
size correlates with the proportion of grooming it receives (gi), while the edges correlate with the
grooming i gives to j (gij). For clarity, associations and grooming proportions below 0.10 are not
plotted (i.e., aij < 0.10, gij < 0.10). Note that individual 10 is the highest ranked individual.
Individuals that feed together form an asymmetrical grooming relationship, while individuals that
do not feed together form a symmetrical relationship (or they do not groom each other).
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Figure 5: Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the proportion of grooming directed
towards the alpha (hα) and towards the individual one rank up the hierarchy (h1) (panel a) and the
hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance (τ) (panel b) as a function of the number of patches. Parameter
values as in Fig. 4. The dashed line in panel a shows the expected proportions if grooming actions
were chosen randomly. The dashed line in panel b shows hu = 0.5.
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Figure 6: Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance
(τ) as a function of the number of patches. Parameter values as in Fig. 4. Panel a: q0 = 3, panel
b: q0 = 9. The dashed line shows hu = 0.5.
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Figure 7: Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance
(τ) as a function of the number of patches. Parameter values as in Fig. 4. Panel a: β = −3, panel
b: β = 3. The dashed line shows hu = 0.5.
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Figure 8: Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance
(τ) as a function of the number of patches. Parameter values as in Fig. 4. Panel a: d = 0, panel
b: d = 10. The dashed line shows hu = 0.5.
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Figure 9: Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance
(τ) as a function of the number of patches. Parameter values as in Fig. 4. Panel a: b = 1.5, panel
b: b = 4.5. The dashed line shows hu = 0.5.
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Supplementary material
In this supplementary material, we complement the analysis of the main text. First, we derive
eq. 19. Second, we show that out choice regarding the number of time steps to reach the quasi-
equilibrium is sufficient. Third, we show that our qualitative results regarding grooming up the
hierarchy are robust for alternative assumptions regarding the patch quality, the number of in-
dividuals (N), and the intensity of competition modulated by the level of food wastage through
interference (m). Finally, with a special version of the model we attempt to create conditions
where individuals tend to groom one rank up the hierarchy, but we find that the grooming directed
towards the alpha individual still outweighs the grooming one rank up the hierarchy (hα > h1).
Stochastic approximation of learning dynamics
For the case N = 2 and assuming only grooming interactions (skipping stage 2, 3, and 4 of
an interaction round), we can straightforwardly derive differential equations for the probabilities
pG1,t(2) and p
G
1,t(2) that individual 1 grooms 2 and 2 grooms 1, respectively, by way of applying
stochastic approximation as detailed in (Dridi and Lehmann, 2014, 2015). Indeed, using eqs. 5-6
of the main text (by setting piFij,t), we have by using eq. 11 and eq. 13 of (Dridi and Lehmann,
2014) that
dpG1,t(2)
dt
=
(
1− pG1,t(2)
)(
δ log
(
1− pG1,t(2)
pG1,t(2)
)
+ λ
[
pG2,t(1)b−
(
pG1,t(2)c+
(
1− pG1,t(2)
)
γ
)])
dpG2,t(1)
dt
=
(
1− pG2,t(1)
)(
δ log
(
1− pG2,t(1)
pG2,t(1)
)
+ λ
[
pG1,t(2)b−
(
pG1,t(2)c+
(
1− pG1,t(2)
)
γ
)])
.
(1)
If we further assume that λ dominates δ (λ  δ), then we can neglect the first terms in these
equations (that account for randomness in choice) and simply write
dpG1,t(2)
dt
∼ λ (1− pG1,t(2)) [pG2,t(1)b− (pG1,t(2)c+ (1− pG1,t(2)) γ)]
dpG2,t(1)
dt
∼ λ (1− pG2,t(1)) [pG1,t(2)b− (pG1,t(2)c+ (1− pG1,t(2)) γ)] , (2)
which is the equation presented in the main text. To compare to individual-based simulations (see
Fig. 2 of the main text), we used eq. 1
Variance in the hierarchy score
In order to determine whether Teq = 4000 is a sufficient time period to reach the quasi-equilibrium,
we investigated the how the standard deviation of our main statistic, the hierarchy score (hu),
varied over time. We find in general that the standard deviation slowly drops in roughly the first
500-2000 time steps, after which it continues to vary, but the pattern of variation remains stable
(Fig. S1). Therefore, a period of Teq = 4000 is sufficient to reach the quasi-equilibrium.
Testing patch quality assumptions
We find that using different assumptions regarding patch quality does not have a qualitative effect
on the outcome. We tested both the case where the patch quality is either high or low and
where all patches are of equal patch quality (see section “Stage 4 - Feeding” from the main text
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for additional information on our assumptions regarding feeding). Despite alternative assumptions
regarding quality, we continue to find that the hierarchy score (hu) is non-monotonic in the number
of patches (NP), where the score is maximized for an intermediate number of patches, and decreases
for higher or lower number of patches (Fig. S2). Additionally, for NP = 10 for when all patches are
of equal quality we find that grooming is exactly reciprocal. Here, all individuals will maximize
payoff when feeding alone on a patch, and thus there is no incentive to groom for tolerance.
Additional variables
Effect of group size
In order to determine the robustness of our results we varied the group size (N). We find we can
qualitatively reproduce similar patterns for the grooming up the hierarchy score (hu) for group
sizes ranging from 5 to up to 100. However, for larger groups the aggressiveness needs to be lower
(Fig. S3). For example, in order to maximize grooming up the hierarchy for NP = 1 with N = 50
we require β = −6, while for N = 5 we require β = −3. This is due to the extra competition that
accompanies the extra individuals for N = 50. Therefore, larger groups need to be less aggressive
in order to successfully trade grooming for tolerance. In general, however, the results presented in
the main text appear to be robust for group size.
Effect of food competition due to m
Whereas the number of patches NP determine the average number of other individuals a focal has
to compete with on a food patch, the parameter m regulates the level of interference. That is, the
larger m the more food is wasted when multiple individuals are feeding on the same patch. We find
that increasing m results in less grooming up the hierarchy (hu decreases, Fig. 4a, c). Reducing
m has the same effect as reducing q0, since it reduces the payoff of when individuals co-feed on a
patch. If individuals gain less payoff when feeding on a patch, strong feeding associations (high
aij) between individuals are less likely to occur, since individuals will vary their patch choice more.
This results in low ranking individuals not grooming for tolerance. We find that increasing the
average patch quality through q0 counters the effect of increasing m (Fig. 4b, d).
Conditions favouring grooming one rank up the hierarchy
In an attempt to identify conditions where individuals are likely to groom one rank up the hierarchy,
we performed several additional simulations where we (rather artificially) created conditions where
we would expect such grooming to occur. We used a different equation to compute the payoff per
individual on a patch here. These payoffs are shown in panel a and b of Fig. S5. As individual
payoff drops sharply if more than two individuals feed on the same patch, such payoffs will “force”
the group to feed in pairs on the available patches. In panel c simulations are done with the
patch payoffs as in panel a. We find that the proportion of grooming directed to the alpha is
still higher than one rank up the hierarchy. On closer inspection we find that the second highest
ranked individual avoid feeding with the alpha here since its payoff is maximized by feeding on
patch k = 2 and receiving extra grooming. If it would be feeding on the same patch as the alpha
it would have to invest in grooming the alpha and thus, despite the higher payoff from feeding,
would get a lower overall payoff. Increasing the payoff difference between patches does increase
the proportion grooming that is directed one rank up the hierarchy (panel d, where payoffs are as
in panel b). However, the proportion of grooming directed to the alpha still slightly outweighs the
proportion of grooming one rank up the hierarchy. As such, our model cannot explain grooming
of closely ranked individuals very well. Other factors not capture here may lead to such grooming
to occur more frequently.
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Figure S 1: The average hierarchy score (hu) and its standard deviation (over 100 replicates) over
time. Parameter values: c = 1, b = 3, γ = 0.5, λ = 0.25, δ = 0.1, β = 1,  = 1, d = 2,m = 0.5, N =
10. Panel a: NP = 2, panel b: NP = 5.
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Figure S 2: Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance
(τ) as a function of the number of patches. Parameter values: c = 1, b = 3, γ = 0.5, λ = 0.25, δ =
0.1, β = 1,  = 1, d = 2, q0 = 4,m = 0.5, N = 10, panel a: high/low patch quality scenario, panel
b: equal patch quality scenario. The dashed line shows hu = 0.5.
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Figure S 3: Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance
(τ) as a function of the number of patches. Parameter values: c = 1, b = 3, γ = 0.5, λ = 0.25, δ =
0.1,  = 1, d = 2, q0 = 6,m = 0.5, with patch quality given by eq. 3. Panel a: N = 5, β = −6, panel
b: N = 50, β = −6, panel c: N = 5, β = −3, panel d: N = 50, β = −3, panel e: N = 5, β = 0,
panel f: N = 50, β = 0. The dashed line shows hu = 0.5.
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Figure S 4: Mean and standard error (over 10 replicates) of the hierarchy score (hu) and tolerance
(τ) as a function of the number of patches. Parameter values: c = 1, b = 3, γ = 0.5, λ = 0.25, δ =
0.1, β = 1,  = 1, d = 2, with patch quality given by eq. 3. Panel a: m = 1, q0 = 6, panel b:
m = 1, q0 = 10, panel c: m = 1.5, q0 = 6, panel d: m = 1.5, q0 = 14. Whereas increasing m makes
grooming more reciprocal (hu → 0.5), increasing q0 cancels the effect. The dashed line shows
hu = 0.5.
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Figure S 5: Top row: payoff per individuals as a function of the number of individuals on a patch,
for all five patches. Bottom row: proportion grooming alpha and proportion grooming one rank
up the hierarchy (mean over 10 replicates). Parameter values: c = 1, b = 3, γ = 0.5, λ = 0.25, δ =
0.1, β = 1,  = 1, d = 2,m = 0.5, N = 10, NP = 5.
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General discussion
Social behaviour pervades all layers of life (Ben-Jacob, 2008; Poulsen and Boomsma, 2005;
Schwinning and Weiner, 1998; Clutton-Brock, 2002). Understanding how organisms in varying
environments navigate their behaviour in repeated social interactions is a major area of research
(Maynard Smith, 1979; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Riechert and Hammerstein, 1983; Camerer
and Hua Ho, 1999). In this thesis I contributed to the understanding of repeated interactions by
investigating two main questions. First I asked: “Under which conditions will positive reciprocity,
partner switching, or punishment be dominant in a population if these partner control mechanisms
coevolve?”. I developed two agent-based models in the first two chapters to address this question.
In chapter three of the thesis, I specifically investigated the grooming interactions among primates
by addressing the question: “What are the conditions that cause grooming to be directed up the
hierarchy?”.
Coevolution of partner control mechanisms
The focus of the first chapter was to characterize the conditions where positive reciprocity, pun-
ishment, or partner switching is the dominant partner control mechanism to stabilize cooperation
in a population of unrelated individuals. This study showed that the likelihood of partner switch-
ing emerging as the dominant partner control mechanism in a well-mixed population (meaning
individuals are equally likely to interact with any other member of the population) increases with
increasing number of rounds of interaction, while fewer number of rounds favoured either positive
reciprocity or punishment (depending on the precise tuning of the model parameters). If interac-
tions between individuals are, however, localized to groups then punishment is more likely to be
favoured by selection compared to the well-mixed case.
There is a long list of studies investigating the conditions where one of these partner control
mechanisms is favoured by selection over uncooperative strategies (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Nakamaru and Iwasa, 2006; Powers et al., 2012; Joyce et al.,
2006; Izquierdo et al., 2014). While the aim of these studies is to show that the specific mechanism
can indeed favour the evolution of cooperation for the given conditions, inferences regarding the
likelihood of the mechanism to be observed in natural populations cannot as easily be made.
For example, demonstrating that the tit-for-tat strategy outperforms a variety of other positive
reciprocity strategies in well-mixed populations with many rounds of interactions (Axelrod and
Hamilton, 1981), does not necessarily mean that this strategy should be observed under natural
conditions. Previous studies, as well as the first chapter of this thesis, show that under such
conditions partner switching is much more likely to be the dominant partner control mechanism
(Joyce et al., 2006; Izquierdo et al., 2010). Studies such as these demonstrate that the question
to be asked should not be “What is the range of conditions where this particular mechanism can
stabilize cooperation in a population?”, but instead have a form like “Under these conditions,
which mechanism is likely to evolve?”. Chapter one is the first to compare the partner control
mechanisms positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching in a single model, and as such
its insights should guide future studies into developing more relevant models.
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The second chapter is a continuation of the first that, for most species, increased the realism of
the model by adding overlapping generations, limited migration of offspring between demes, and
a cost correlating to the complexity of strategies to the model. The results of the second chapter
give several valuable insights. Firstly, since the second chapter makes a direct comparison with the
first, it clearly demonstrates how various assumptions can affect the competitiveness of each partner
control mechanism. It was shown that partner switching benefits from regular changes in the group
composition due to generational overlap as it increases the number of potential partners, while
punishment is most strongly affected by the cost for strategic complexity. Secondly, the second
chapter allowed to compare the competitiveness of unconditional strategies versus conditional ones.
Although for both conditional and unconditional strategies conditions were identified that favoured
one type over the other, conditional strategies were more likely to be favoured by selection for most
of the parameter space.
Grooming up the hierarchy
In the third chapter I investigated how the intensity of food competition and other factors (such
as aggressiveness) affects grooming patterns in primates: in particular, how much grooming is
directed up the hierarchy. The results showed that if competition is low (i.e., there are many
patches to feed on) individuals will spread out over the available patches and since they mostly do
not compete over the same food source, there is little grooming up the hierarchy. If competition
increases, then pairs of individuals will more often find themselves feeding on the same patch, where
the lower ranked individual will groom the higher ranked one in order to be tolerated. For even
higher competition, grooming up the hierarchy does not necessarily increase. Under conditions of
intense food competition, multiple individuals may attempt to feed on the same patch. Here, a
low ranked individual is unlikely to be tolerated by all higher ranking ones, and thus will almost
always be evicted. As it will also not groom for tolerance then, overall the grooming pattern will
become more reciprocal.
The model is a major step forward in primatology. Up until now, the only quantitative models
to investigate grooming up the hierarchy were done by Seyfarth and Sambrook et al, the latter being
an extension of Seyfarth’s model (Seyfarth, 1977; Sambrook et al., 1995). However, in these models
the individuals have fixed preferences on whom to groom, and the individuals would therefore not
be able to adjust to a changing environment (i.e., in the absence of food competition the individuals
would continue to groom up the hierarchy). By making the motivations to groom other individuals
variable in the model in chapter three, allowed individuals to adjust to the state of the environment.
The model replicated the main finding by Seyfarth in that grooming was found to be directed up
the hierarchy under conditions where high ranked individuals can provide alternative benefits to
trade for grooming (i.e., tolerance). Additionally, the absence of food competition resulted in
individuals trading grooming reciprocally, a pattern that is not obtainable in Seyfarth’s model.
The grooming model formalized several theories and ideas that are concerned with social re-
lationships in primates. First, the so-called socioecological model describes how factors such as
food competition determine social relationships (van Schaik, 1989; Sterck et al., 1997; Kappeler
and van Schaik, 2002). As the model is verbal, no quantitative predictions can be derived from it.
The grooming model developed in the third chapter, however, makes this link explicit and demon-
strates how the intensity of competition (due to the number of available food patches) determines
the grooming up the hierarchy. Second, one of the hypotheses on how primates make decision is
by emotional bookkeeping (Aureli and Schaffner, 2002; Schino and Aureli, 2009, 2016). The idea is
that a primate has partner specific emotions that are updated through the various interactions it
has with others. While there is some empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis, the mechanics
of it remained obscure. In the third chapter these mechanics are captured in clear and simple
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equations, describing precisely how the payoffs from different interactions can be translated into
a single motivational state or emotion. The model shows stable grooming bonds emerging over
longer periods of time as predicted by emotional bookkeeping.
Unification of both approaches
The two approaches to study repeated interactions in this thesis differ greatly from each other.
The models in the first two chapters simulated the evolution of a population where individuals
have different strategies. The model in the third chapter simulated the interactions in a group of
primates where all individuals had a single strategy: a learning rule. While the models all had
merit in their own right, increasingly valuable insights can be obtained by combining different
elements of both evolutionary and learning models.
The strategies used in chapter one and two were pure (prescribing a specific action for each
possible situation) and limited to a single round of memory. Such a restriction was needed in order
to reduce the size of the set of strategies and keep the model tractable. However, an arguably more
realistic way of modelling the strategies would be to implement learning rules, similar to those used
in the grooming model. It is frequently argued that most interesting behaviours are flexible and
a variety of models have investigated the evolution of learning rules (Harley, 1981; Fawcett et al.,
2013; Dridi and Lehmann, 2014, 2015). Additionally, from a neuroscientific point of view learning
rules appear to be more easily linked to the neuronal decision making (Dayan and Abbott, 2005;
Niv, 2009). Although frequently the interest might be purely in the expressed behaviour, without
considerations of the mechanisms that produce the behaviour, if one is to understand the behaviour
that organisms express in repeated interactions, then eventually the underlying mechanisms need
to be studied. In the first two chapters the main interest was in which form of partner control
is most likely to dominate under various conditions, and in order to simplify the models, using
“simple” pure strategies were used to investigate the question. However, an important next step
would be to try and implement a variety of learning rules in order to approximate better the
decision making process.
A second aspect of the grooming model that is worthy to incorporate into the evolutionary
models is that of asymmetry. In the grooming model the individuals were asymmetric in the sense
that the probability of winning a contest depended on the ranks of both individuals engaged in the
contest. In nature, organisms are bound to be asymmetric in some respect. This asymmetry can be
in the size of the individuals, the fighting abilities, in the ownership of a territory, or any other trait.
A range of models, mostly concerned with animal contests, have described how asymmetries can
affect the interactions between the individuals and determine the outcome (Maynard Smith and
Parker, 1976; Selten, 1980; Hammerstein, 1981; Enquist and Leimar, 1983; Leimar and Enquist,
1984; Enquist and Leimar, 1987, 1990; Samuelson and Zhang, 1992; Binmore and Samuelson,
2001). However, studies on the evolution of cooperation and helping behaviours tend to neglect
asymmetries in their models (Boyd et al., 2003; Santos et al., 2011; Shutters, 2011; Garc´ıa and
Traulsen, 2012). However, punishment is often directed from a dominant individual towards a
subordinate one (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995), since if a low ranked or weaker individual
punishes a higher ranked or stronger one, the punishment will likely not have the desired effect,
and the weaker individual is likely to refrain from punishing the other. For example, in pairs of
cleaner fish it is the larger male that chases (punishes) the female and not the other way around
(Raihani et al., 2010).
Asymmetries can thus potentially determine the likelihood of successful punishment: i.e., the
recipient changing its behaviour. Therefore, incorporating asymmetries is an important next step
in the study on the evolution of punishment, cooperation, and helping behaviours. In the models
of chapter one and two individuals were assumed to be symmetrical, and thus a logical extension
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of those models would be to incorporate a form of asymmetry in order to investigate how this may
affect the competitiveness of punishment as a partner control mechanism.
Conversely, an interesting extension of the grooming model would be to allow various traits to
evolve. The main goal of this model was to investigate how food competition influences grooming
patterns, and therefore the model was set up to be a proximate one. However, this means that
various traits that are likely to vary between individuals were instead assumed to be constant.
Aggression, for example, varies between primate species, populations, and individuals (Isbell, 1991;
Fairbanks et al., 2004), and it is not unlikely that levels of aggression evolve due to the distribution
and quality of food (determining the intensity of food competition) that a population experiences,
since much of the aggression in primates is related to food competition (Janson and van Schaik,
1988). It would therefore be interesting to let aggression evolve, in order to determine how the
intensity of food competition may result in selection of the level of aggressiveness (Vogel and Janson,
2011). Furthermore, while we assumed fixed parameters as to how motivations were updated as a
result of the interactions, these may similarly evolve. For example, receiving grooming was assumed
to have a fixed effect on the motivation as well as winning or losing a contest. However, winning
a contest over a food source may be especially important if food sources are scarce, and selection
may therefore act on such traits. While investigating the evolution of these traits in concert with
the proximate effects of food competition was outside the scope of this thesis, in future research
these are interesting questions to address.
Although in chapter two we investigated how interactions between related individuals may
affect the evolution of partner control mechanisms, in the grooming model we made the simplify-
ing assumption that all individuals were unrelated. Primate species are often characterized by a
philopatric sex and a dispersing one, where is most cases the females are philopatric (Pusey and
Packer, 1987). This obviously results in interactions between related individuals. Additionally,
female philopatry often leads to the formation of a matrilineal society, such as in macaques, ba-
boons, and vervets (Silk, 2002). Here, daughters of the matriline tend to inherit the dominance
rank of the mother and related individuals regularly support one another in agonistic interactions
(reviewed in Silk, 2002). Additionally, a meta-analysis showed that primates have a strong pref-
erence to groom their kin (Schino, 2001). Therefore, both grooming motivations and the outcome
of agonistic interactions are likely to depend strongly on the presence of kin. In chapter three the
main interest was in the effect of food competition on grooming behaviour, and therefore individ-
uals were assumed to be unrelated. However, introducing such a structure would be an interesting
extension, since other meta-analyses showed significant effects for both grooming reciprocity and
grooming for rank-related benefits even when controlling for kinship (Schino, 2007; Schino and
Aureli, 2008). Further models are thus required to understand how the presence of kin will affect
a grooming network, when it is better to support or tolerate kin versus non-kin, and how the state
of the environment influences the tendency to associate with kin or not.
Empirically informed models
The thesis originally set out to develop empirically informed models, i.e., models that are strongly
based on empirical evidence. Although throughout the development of all models this was always
kept in mind, it is easier said than done. The main empirical evidence on which the models
in chapters one and two are based, is that in pairwise interactions in nature different partner
control mechanisms may be used to stabilize cooperation. However, most models attempting
to explain cooperation, tend to focus on a single control mechanism. These models therefore
cannot explain the occurrence of a partner control mechanism in nature as other partner control
mechanisms may outcompete the one that is tested in their model. Despite the comparison of
partner control mechanisms in the current work, the models themselves still required a variety
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of simplifying assumptions that are “less” empirically informed, such as pure strategies. These
simplifying assumptions are necessary in order to keep the model tractable. Finding the right
balance is a major challenge for the development of these models.
An additional challenge was identified during the development of the grooming model. Here,
much time was consumed in order to establish a set of learning rules that match primate behaviour.
Understanding precisely how a primate takes its actions is a formidable task. Despite the impressive
amount of primate data that has been generated, the data does not inform how an individual will
change its probability to groom or engage another individual as a consequence of co-feeding with it.
In other words, despite the wealth of data, translating this to decision rules is a major challenge.
However, after many lengthy discussions a coherent set of equations emerged, which (as discussed
in chapter three) appear to resemble the observations well.
Concluding remarks
The study on repeated social interactions is a broad topic, as exemplified by the current work. Both
questions that are addressed here have explored a relatively unexplored area in their respective
fields of study. Using agent-based models allowed me to characterize the conditions where specific
partner control mechanisms are likely to dominate in a population engaged in pairwise interactions.
Such insights are crucial in understanding the presence of cooperation and helping behaviours in
nature. Additionally, I have shown how food competition and other factors of primate life influence
what grooming patterns might emerge, and how varying parameters of the model can capture the
variation in grooming patterns in primate populations.
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